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PEACE KEEPING AND THE UNITED NATIONS STRUCTURE
PREFACE 
Chapter 1
The Nature of Peace-Keeping in the Light of Past Practice
The experience of World War II has demonstrated that war 
is enormously destructive. Therefore, when the United Nations 
Charter was signed in 1945, it was natural that the main 
anxiety of the international community should be the 
maintenance of international peace and the building up of 
international machinery to deal with aggression and to achieve 
disarmament "to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war".'*'
The Charter requires Members to "refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
2United Nations", and requires too that "all Members shall 
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such 
a manner that international peace and security, and justice,
3are not endangered". The Charter set the maintenance of 
international peace and security as the first purpose of the 
Organization. It defined two main approaches to the 
realisation of this purpose. Firstly, by the settlement of 
international disputes or situations by peaceful means. 
Secondly, by using collective measures for preventing or
1. Preamble of the Charter, p.l.
2. The Charter, Article 2, para 4.
3. The Charter, Article 2, para 3.
2removing threats to the peace and suppressing acts of 
aggression or breaches of the peace. The Charter distinguishes 
between the functions of the General Assembly and the Security 
Council by placing on the latter the "primary responsibility" 
for the maintenance of peace, while the General Assembly is 
prevented from dealing with that matter in a way that might 
embarrass the Security Council, while its functions in other 
regards are very wide and general. The Charter goes on, 
however, to permit the use of force by the United Nations or, 
more accurately, by states acting under its flag, in 
collective action against minor aggressors in conditions which 
find the major powers unanimously supporting or at least 
permitting such action.
The then Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag 
Hammarskjöld noted that "in 1945 the governments were unwilling 
to give to the U.N. any sovereign powers with the sole 
exception of the Security Council's power to order enforcement 
action to prevent or suppress armed aggression when - and only 
when - the five Great Powers agreed unanimously to do so. In 
every other respect, the United Nations was always intended to 
rely for the accomplishment of its purposes upon the moral 
power of the undertakings of the Charter and upon the influence 
which its recommendations could exert upon the policies of its 
Members".^ The Charter does not provide a system for United 
Nations action to repress aggression launched or supported by 
any of the major powers. The veto system of Article 27 
represents the element that prevents the creation of any forces 
under United Nations banner for resistance to great-power
4. United Nations: Office of Public Information, Press
Services, Press Release SG/376, February 24, 1954, p.2.
L
3aggression. The cold war had produced many difficulties in 
securing Great Power agreement within the Security Council.
The maintenance of international peace and security was to be 
achieved by recognizing the residual responsibility of the 
General Assembly.
In fact, even at a time when much of the political 
activity of the United Nations, and especially of the Security 
Council, was interrupted by the contestants in the cold war, 
the United Nations was able to demonstrate in a number of 
serious crises that it could help in preserving peace and 
security by using other means under the auspices of the Charter 
and particularly by creating a peace-keeping mechanism, based 
on participation and voluntary co-operation. This technique 
was successfully developed in a series of conflict situations, 
the first of these being the military observer groups in 
Palestine and Kashmir. The process which has come to be known 
as peace-keeping although not specifically described in the 
Charter, eventually became a new and a hopeful international 
scheme. The most promising factors are to be found in cases 
which have involved the use of United Nations Forces for 
purposes other than fighting against aggressors, for 
supervising truces, patrolling borders or armistice lines, or 
observing the degree to which rival parties respect agreed 
arrangements for regulating their relationships. These are 
peace-keeping operations to help disputant states to find a 
solution to their problems with the United Nations responsible 
for avoiding the outbreak or renewal of hostilities.
The term "peace-keeping operation" is neither mentioned 
nor defined as such in the Charter, nor has any effort been 
made, until 1956, in any United Nations body to attempt a clear
4and precise definition of the term. But it is used in this
paper as a means of differentiating the new procedures from
those which went by the name of collective security. The use
of military forces for enforcement action under Chapter VII
of the Charter is a quite different matter. The U.N. action
in Korea in the fifties was in theory the only instance of
5an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter. But 
in fact it was not a real U.N. operation. Though it was 
created under Security Council resolution, it was in fact 
under United States command, was mainly financed by the United 
States and in general, it was not under the executive control 
of any United Nations organ. In fact there has been a 
transition from the concept of collective security as set out 
in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to a more 
practical idea of peace-keeping, which has become the most 
important aspect of UN action in the field of international 
security.^
If we look through the UN practice with respect to this 
kind of activity, we can notice that from small and informal 
beginnings a body of precedents has grown up over the years 
of using military personnel of Member States on peace-keeping 
operations in a variety of circumstances and for different 
purposes. What are called "peace-keeping operations" have 
varied greatly in size, in scope, and in methods of financing, 
as in methods of management and control. All of them have 
been distinctive and few generalizations are possible about 
them as a group.
5. Charter 2 of this paper.
6. Charter 2 of this paper.
5The Secretary-General in his two reports of November 4 
7and 6, 1956, laid down the principles of the UN Forces. No 
permanent member of the Security Council or any "interested" 
government should contribute contingents, the Force should 
not be used to affect the military or political outcome of 
the dispute, its arms should only be used in self-defence, 
and it should not be stationed on a state's territory except 
with that state's consent. Speaking at Harvard in June 1963, 
Secretary-General U Thant explained that peace-keeping forces 
"are essentially peace and not fighting forces and they 
operate only with the consent of the parties directly 
concerned". Their essential character was a moral presence 
of the United Nations, to ensure that neither side can 
endanger the peace without involving itself in larger 
international consequences. This is a temporary presence, 
and it has nothing to do with the solving of the problems 
which have given rise to its creation.
The success of temporary United Nations Forces prompted 
many governments to look for the possibility of establishing 
a force on a permanent basis, which would be under the 
control of either the Security Council or the General 
Assembly. There are, however, many problems in the way of 
creating such forces, problems of functions, composition, 
size, command, where it is going to be stationed and, most 
important, how it is to be financed. There is less 
disagreement between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union as to
7. UN Documents A/3289 and A/3302.
6the shape the UN force is to take than about its cfcvon . 
Both see a permanent force as a long-term goal, necessary for 
disarmament but too expensive at present.
The Charter provided for the use of UN military forces 
on a national contingent basis, by asking all members to 
provide on the Security Council's call and in accordance with 
special agreements, armed forces, assistance and all 
facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security, but attempts to achieve 
agreement among the major powers on the principles governing 
the forming of these forces were not successful. Secretary-gGeneral Trygve Lie proposed in June of 1948, that the General 
Assembly create a permanent United Nations Guard Force of 
relatively modest size - 1,000 to 5,000 men - to provide 
support for field missions. It was agreed by the General
9Assembly in 1949 to provide for a UN Field Service of 300 men 
supported by Member governments to supply certain technical 
aid to field missions, and in addition a Field Service Panel 
of trained persons who might be called to service by decision 
of the General Assembly or the Security Council. This, of 
course, could not constitute a peace-keeping force in the 
general meaning of the term as it was used later by the United 
Nations.
Peace-keeping operations are not "enforcement" forces, 
they are not "permanent", but still the concept is open to a
8. UN Document A/565. Annual Report of the Secretary-General 
on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1947, 3 June 1948, 
pp.(XVII-XVIII).
9. G.A. Res. 297 (IV), 22 November 1949.
7variety of definitions and has been used in several ways.
The lack of an agreed definition has made the task of 
discussing peace-keeping problems more difficult. Broadly 
defined, it could include everything which the UN does in the 
political field to establish "peace and security"; accordingly, 
peace-keeping would to a very great extent include all the 
UN's political operations, except its single attempt at 
collective security - its part in the Korean War. In a 
narrow concept peace-keeping operations are the use of 
military force. This excludes all other activities of the 
United Nations limited to fact finding, conciliation, 
mediation, etc. without using military force. Probably, there 
could be no obvious reason why peace-keeping should not also 
include such operations, which the UN has established on many 
occasions in the name of peace.
Yet Allan James has insisted on analysing peace-keeping 
operations by asking, in each case, what the UN is trying to 
do, the functions which the UN is attempting to fulfil. In 
this outline, UN peace-keeping operations may fall into three 
categories: patching-up, prophylaxis, and proselytism.
"Patching-up" consists of activity which is intended to 
realize an agreement between disputants or to assist in the 
execution of a settlement. But if the UN is faced with 
conditions which are at least threatening, and which cannot 
guarantee a realistic negotiated settlement, it may therefore 
adopt a second prophylactic approach by trying to prevent the 
deterioration of the situation, such as the crisis in Cyprus, 
when the UN's Force intervened to prevent intercommunal 
violence. The third category in this analysis comprises 
those UN operations which are neither conciliatory nor
8preventive but which are instituted out of a desire to 
upset certain aspects of the established order.
These are instances of United Nations proselytism, in which 
the Organization seeks to act as an instrument of change in 
order to rid the world community of situations which the 
majority regard as unfair. South Africa provides the major 
example of this in its policy of apartheid. Or, a Power's 
determined effort to retain its overseas possessions may 
stimulate the United Nations to adopt measures designed to 
produce a reassessment of that policy, as in the case of the 
Portuguese colonies.
But the activities of the UN in keeping the peace do 
not always correspond to this division, because sometimes the 
Organization has engaged at the same time and in relation to 
the same situation, in both patching up and prophylactic 
efforts, as in Kashmir. Then, too, an operation may be 
transferred from one function to another. For instance, in 
the Suez crisis of 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force 
helped to patch up the situation by supervising the withdrawal 
of the invaders from Egypt. After the accomplishment of this 
task in March 1957, it took on a prophylactic role. Moreover 
the functions which the UN operation is intended to fulfil 
may sometimes be unclear, so it is necessary to look behind 
the formal terms, especially to the debates in the relevant 
bodies, but this by no means suffices to clarify the real 
purposes of the operations.
10. Alan James, The Politics of Peace-Keeping, pp.7 and 9.
9All of these terms and others may be of great value 
according to the purpose of the particular study. However, 
the purpose of this research is to concentrate on peace­
keeping operations involving military forces. The Korean 
case, where the UN endorsed and encouraged joint action 
against North Korean aggression is excluded. In this 
instance, action by the United Nations was made possible 
only by the existence of a particular set of circumstances 
which were not likely to be repeated. These circumstances 
facilitated the implementation of Chapter VII of the Charter 
which gave the Council the right to use military force to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. It 
seems then appropriate to deal with the delicate and complex 
question of "peace-keeping operation" in two parts. The 
first one will deal with the nature and scope of UN peace­
keeping operations in the light of its experience. In this 
part the differentiation will be between the United Nations 
peace keeping operations established or authorized by the 
Security Council and other operations established or 
authorized by the General Assembly. The second part will 
deal with the role of the Secretary-General in the operation 
and the financial problems of peace-keeping. The concluding 
remarks will discuss the future prospects of peace-keeping 
operations and the growing role of the Super Powers.
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PART ONE
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS
Chapter 2
The Role of the Security Council
The United Nations has a leading role in preserving 
and enforcing international security, this responsibility 
being assigned to the Security Council. The Charter places 
upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and Members 
"agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their b e h a l f ^  
The Security Council alone is directed to determine the 
measures to be taken in case of a threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace or act of aggression, and to recommend or decide 
measures to be taken to restore international peace and 
security.
The Charter confers on the Security Council powers which 
far exceed those possessed by any of the other bodies of the 
United Nations and they are greater than have ever before 
been exercised by any international organization. No League 
institution possessed such powerful capacity for maintaining 
international peace and security as that given to the Security 
Council by the Charter. The Covenant of the League contained 
a comprehensive scheme for the settlement of international 
disputes. By Article 12 the members agreed that 'if there 
should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a 
rupture' they would deal with it in one of three ways: they
11. The Charter, Article 24, para 1.
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would submit it to arbitration, or to the Permanent Court, 
or to inquiry by the Council. In the first alternative the 
award, and in the second the judicial decision, had to be 
given within a reasonable time. In the third the Council had 
to make its report within six months; the members agreed that 
they would not 'resort to war' until three months after the 
award or the decision or the report as the case might be.
Article 13 of the Covenant dealt with the first two 
alternatives provided by Article 12, and indicated the 
disputes which were considered generally suitable for 
arbitration or judicial settlement. In the event of failure 
to carry out an award or judgement, the Council was to 
propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. 
Article 15 dealt with the third alternative of Article 12, 
the submission of a dispute to the Council. The Council's 
first task was 'to endeavour to effect a settlement of the 
dispute', and if it succeeded it was then to publish a 
statement of the facts and the terms of settlement. If, 
however, this attempt to get the parties to agree should fail, 
the Council's next duty was 'to make and publish a report 
containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the 
recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard 
thereto'. The Council had no power to dictate a settlement 
to the parties; its function was not an arbitral one. The 
effect of its report differed according to whether it was 
reached unanimously (the votes of the parties to the dispute 
being excluded) or by a majority vote: if it was unanimous,
'the members of the League agree that they will not go to war 
with any party to the dispute which complies with the
12
recommendations of the report'; if it was a majority report
only, they 'reserve to themselves the right to take such
action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance
of right and justice'. In other words, in neither case were
the parties actually bound to accept the report. But a party
which accepted a unanimous report was guaranteed against
attack by the other, whereas a majority report did not carry
this guarantee, and the parties were free to go to war,
after the interval prescribed by Article 12, if they chose.
Article 16 contained the 'sanctions' provisions, and the
circumstances in which these were to be put into force was
clearly defined; it was that a member should 'resort to war
in disregard of its covenants'. The occasion for sanctions
was precisely defined and it was left to each of the members
to decide for itself whether the occasion had arisen, and
consequently whether it was under obligation to join in the
imposition of sanctions. The Council might recommend plans
for co-ordinating the actions of the members in that event,
but it could not make decisions on their behalf, nor issue
directions which they would be bound to follow. There was
thus a risk that the several members might not all decide 
12alike. The Charter provisions marked an attempt to improve 
on the League of Nations' system for peace preservation, which 
was based on a universal responsibility for collective security.
Unlike the Covenant the Charter contains no specific 
programme for the exercise of the powers of the Security 
Council, but it makes an important distinction between powers
12. Walters, F.P., "A History of the League of Nations",
London, Oxford University Press, 1952.
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relating to the Security Council's function of promoting 
pacific settlement and those relating to enforcement action.
In fact, in relation to the former, it has, strictly speaking, 
no powers; its decisions are no more than recommendations 
to the parties. While Chapter VI of the Charter gave the 
Council the right only to recommend measures for peacefully 
settling international disputes, Chapter VII gave it the 
right to undertake direct positive action by ordering 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and 
of rail, sea, air and other means of communication, the 
severance of diplomatic relations, and use of military forces 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Such rights were given only to the Security Council if there 
was unanimous agreement among its five permanent members. 
(Article 27, para 3)
If the decisions of the Security Council involve action 
for maintenance of peace, it could "make recommendations or 
decide what measures shall be taken" (Article 39) to maintain 
or restore international peace and security, and before making 
the recommendations or deciding upon the measures it may call 
upon the parties concerned to comply with any necessary 
provisional measures without prejudice to their rights, and 
it "shall duly take account of failure to comply with such 
provisional measures" (Article 40). The Security Council has 
the right to determine what constitutes a threat or a breach 
or an aggression and there are no restrictions on its 
determination except for its general obligation to act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations. All the members of the United Nations undertake to 
make available to the Security Council "on its call and in
14
accordance with a special agreement or agreements" (Article 
43, para 1) armed forces and other forms of assistance and 
facilities.
Decisions of the Security Council require the
affirmative votes of nine members, but these must include
the votes of all the five permanent members. Each of the
five permanent members thus has a veto on decisions. There
was no disagreement among the major powers at San Francisco
on the principle that the unanimity of the major powers
should be required. The Great Powers refused to accept a
system of voting under which they might be outvoted, and in
the scheme which was embodied in the Charter they insisted
13on a privileged position. At Yalta, the powers accepted
President Roosevelt's proposal that a member of the Security
Council, party to a dispute, whether a permanent member or not,
should not be permitted to participate in voting a decision
which the Council might take in practising its function of
14peaceful settlement or adjustment.
Despite the apparently vast extent of the powers of the 
Security Council, this veto has always limited their real 
significance. Therefore, no decision can be reached if any 
of the five permanent members objects. Thus, in effect the 
maintenance of international peace and security was the 
responsibility of all permanent members. The veto makes it 
impossible for the Security Council ever to use its powers
13. At Dumbarton Oaks Conference - 21 August 1944.
14. Article 27, para 3.
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against a Great Power. Aggression by such Power can 
seriously endanger the peace. No enforcement action can 
be taken in such a case without threats to the peace. 
Therefore, the purpose of all these plans drafted in the 
Charter is to deal with conflicts between small powers. 
Small-power aggression never has been a serious problem to 
the peace of the world if the Great Powers are agreed among 
themselves, and if they are not, then this machinery cannot 
be useful to world security.
Nevertheless, there are two exceptions to the rule of
voting. Decisions on matters of procedure may be agreed by
votes of any nine members, and when a member is a party to
a dispute which the Security Council is investigating that
member must abstain from voting. The guestion whether a
particular matter is or is not procedural is not itself a
question of procedure and in this case a permanent member
can use its veto on that preliminary question. Moreover,
the Charter differentiates between a "dispute" and "a
situation which might lead to international friction and
15give rise to a dispute", and when the Security Council is 
investigating a "situation", there is nothing to prevent a 
permanent member, however deeply it may be involved, from 
using the veto.^
The Charter provisions leave no doubt that enforcement 
action is the primary responsibility of the Security Council. 
But the concept of the United Nations peace enforcement
15. Article 34.
16. Article 27, para 3.
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scheme based on Great Power co-operation failed to materialise
due to the rapidly deteriorating relations between the Soviet
Union and the Western Powers in the post-war period.
Consequently, the Military Staff Committee, which was composed
of the Chiefs of Staff of the Security Council's permanent
members or their representatives to advise and assist on all
questions relating to the Security Council's military
requirements for the maintenance of international peace and
security, has been inactive since 1947. The Report which the
Committee submitted to the Council on April 30th, 1947, was
17not accepted by the members. It was obvious from the 
discussion in the Committee and later in the Security Council 
that the disagreements resulted primarily from the lack of 
confidence between the Soviet Union and the United States.
As a result the Security Council has not had available to it 
the military forces essential to the full discharge of its 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace. The Military 
Staff Committee ceased to function and the agreements with 
states have never been signed.
Only under exceptional conditions has the Council been 
at all effective in dealing with threats to or breaches of the 
peace where the vital interests of permanent members have been 
directly in conflict. In the case of Korea in 1950, the 
Security Council was presented with a unique opportunity to 
take action in a situation involving the interests of 
permanent members, since the Soviet representative was absent 
in protest against the seating of the Nationalist Government
17. UN Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, 
Special Suppl. No.l, 'Report of the Military Staff 
Committee'.
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of China in the place of the Communist Chinese representative 
to the UN, and when he returned to the Council in August 1950, 
the possibility of further action stopped. While the Security 
Council has been unable, except in the above mentioned 
instance, to initiate collective measures of the kind 
described in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, it has 
nevertheless, within those areas where the permanent members 
have had a common interest in the maintenance of international 
peace and security,been able to agree on a common course of 
action.
Thus, to a large extent the Organization's role in 
maintaining peace and security depends upon its being able 
to prevent disturbances between small states from developing 
into conflicts between powers.* So in dealing with hostilities 
where major powers, for different reasons, were anxious to 
end the conflict without using their armed forces in the 
disputed area, the Security Council was able in many cases, 
such as the Congo and the Middle East crises, to achieve 
considerable progress in realising peace and security.
While the restrictions of the Charter upon the 
authorisation of enforcement measures remain, the organisation 
has demonstrated that it can deploy military forces. But it 
can do this only upon the invitation of the members involved 
and without any right to take military initiatives or to 
violate domestic jurisdiction.
During recent years the Security Council has authorised 
the establishment of several forces for cases when the 
Security Council would be powerless or unwilling to authorise 
enforcement measures:
o w * r s .
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1. In 1948, a United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
(UNTSO) was established in connection with the Palestine 
problem.
2. In 1949, the Security Council constituted the United 
Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI).
3. In dealing with disputes between India and Pakistan the 
Security Council authorised the establishment of the 
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) 
in 1948, and the United Nations Military Observer Group 
in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949, and (UNIPOM)
in 1965.
4. In 1958, the Council created the United Nations Observer 
Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).
5. In 1960, a United Nations Force was sent to the Congo 
(ONUC).
6. In 1963, the Security Council created the (UNYOM) to 
supervise the disengagement in Yeman.
7. In 1964, a Force (UNFICYP) was sent to Cyprus to take 
up positions between the Greek and Turkish communities.
8. In October 1973 the Security Council decided to set up a 
(UNEF) to disengage the Egyptian and Israeli forces.
All the above mentioned United Nations Forces have been 
different in size, in scope and in methods of financing, as 
in methods of management and control. The nature of these 
differences will be considered in the following discussion.
1. Observers for Palestine.
On 29th November 1947, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution for the partition of Palestine, and a commission 
was appointed to ensure transfer of administration from
19
Britain to itself and hand it over to the successor states
two months later. But when Britain withdrew on May 15th,
1948, war broke out between the Arabs and the Jews. The
Security Council was not willing to undertake the enforcement
of the partition plan recommended by the General Assembly,
but exercised steady pressure on the parties to cease fighting
and agree to permanent armistice arrangements. On 23rd April,
18it established a Truce Commission for Palestine, composed
of those Council members other than Syria, which had career
19consuls in Jerusalem. On 14th May 1948, the office of
20United Nations Mediator was established, and the Security
Council chose Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish
Red Cross, as a UN Mediator. After his assassination on 17th
September 1948 he was succeeded by Dr Ralph Bunche and by 11th
December 1948 the General Assembly had established a
Conciliation Commission consisting of three Member States to
assume the functions of the United Nations Mediator. When
Bernadotte requested Belgium, France and the United States to
21provide him with 21 officers each, the Soviet Union argued 
that the Security Council must decide on the establishment of 
the supervisory team, and suggested that each member of the 
Council, other than Syria, should be entitled to send 
observers, but the United States supported the right of the 
Mediator and the Truce Commission to make whatever arrangements 
they thought appropriate and succeeded in defeating the Soviet 
proposal.
18. SC Res. S/727, 23 April 1948.
19. They were Belgium, France and the United States.
20. GA Res. 186 (S-2) of 14 May 1948.
21. A/648, Progress Report of UN Mediator to General Assembly, 
GAOR, 3rd Sess., Suppl.ll, pp.32-33.
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The truce was supervised by 63 observers from the above 
mentioned countries, supported by some volunteers from the 
Headquarters Guard and Secretariat Staff. The main job of 
this group of observers was to investigate incidents, to 
observe and supervise the cease-fire lines and also report, 
when required, to the Security Council. It had no authority 
to prevent violations or enforce its decisions.
War recommenced on 8th July. On the 15th the Security 
Council ordered a cease-fire and instructed the Mediator to 
supervise the observance of the new truce. He approached the 
Truce Commission countries, which agreed to provide 300 
observers and later increased them to 600. The observers 
played the same role during the second truce, but violations 
of the truce increased and in October full-scale hostilities 
resumed. The Security Council accepted a proposal from the 
Acting Mediator that the truce should be replaced by an 
armistice agreement, and rejected a proposal from the Soviet 
Union to require an immediate peace treaty. Armistice 
Agreements were signed between Israel and Egypt on 24th 
February 1949, Israel and Lebanon on 23rd March, Israel and 
Jordon on 3rd April, and Israel and Syria on 20th July.
With the conclusion of the Armistice Agreements, a system 
of international supervision under the general oversight of 
the Council was established because all the Armistice 
Agreements referred to the United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organisation (UNTSO), but, though a Truce Commission had been 
set up, there was never any resolution expressly establishing 
a "Truce Supervision Organisation". The terms of the 
Armistice were to be supervised by a Mixed Armistice
21
Commission (MAC) composed of an equal number of members from 
both sides under the chairmanship of the Chief of Staff of 
UNTSO or one of his senior officers. The Security Council 
on 11th August 1949 asked the Secretary-General to arrange 
for continued service of UNTSO's personnel, and instructed 
UNTSO to observe and maintain the cease-fire and report back 
to it from time to time. The UN Secretariat, with the general 
support of the Security Council, emphasised that UNTSO had an 
independent responsibility for the maintenance of peace, in 
accordance with the Council's decisions of 15th July 1948 
and 11th August 1949.
The UNTSO observers were not permitted by the parties to 
move freely along the Armistice Demarcation Line, and in the 
demilitarised zones and defensive areas the parties insisted 
that they should be accompanied on their investigations by 
liaison officers. This greatly impeded the mobility of the 
observers. The parties also placed restrictions on the 
airfields which could be used by UNTSO's aircraft. UNTSO had 
no legal right to give orders to the parties or to use force 
to prevent incidents, but as long as there was a desire 
between parties to avoid war UNTSO was able to play a valuable 
role by encouraging them to take measures which would reduce 
the possibilities of clashes. Despite these limitations the 
observers were able to perform their duties, but tension 
increased rather than diminished, resulting ultimately in the 
collapse of the armistice when Israel invaded Egypt on 
29 October 1956. UNTSO remained in existence after November 
1956 to implement, observe and supervise the armistice 
structure set up in 1949, but during the actual fighting UNTSO 
played an invaluable role in providing information, and in the
22
immediate aftermath of the cease-fire it rapidly assumed an 
observer role in several crucial areas. After the end of 
the fighting, UNTSO contributed to securing the cease-fire 
agreed upon especially on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts.
On 10th July the Council authorised the Secretary-General to 
make the cease-fire more secure. Israel and Egypt had agreed 
in principle to this, and the observers took their new 
positions. UNTSO's job was to keep the situation quiet, and 
within the limits of its resources it conducted this task to 
the satisfaction of the Security Council.
2. Observers in Indonesia.
Disagreement between the Netherlands and the Republic of
Indonesia over the implementation of the Indonesian
independence agreement of March 1947 led to military
hostilities later that year. The Security Council called for
an end to hostilities and the settlement of the dispute by
22arbitration or other peaceful means. On 25th August 1947 
it adopted a resolution requesting the member-Governments of 
the Council which had career consular representatives in 
Batavia to instruct them to prepare jointly, for the 
information and guidance of the Security Council, reports on 
the situation in the Republic of Indonesia. Such reports were 
to cover the observance of the cease-fire orders and the 
conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation. The 
Council requested the Governments of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Indonesia to grant to the representatives all the 
facilities necessary for the effective fulfilment of their 
mission. The establishment of the career consuls as a
22. SC Res. S/459 of 1 August 1947.
23. SC Res. S/525 (1), 25 August 1947.
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commission of observers was strongly opposed by the Soviet
Union which had urged instead the establishment of a
commission of all Security Council members. Two further
resolutions were passed by the Security Council at that time.
The first provided for the establishment of a Good Offices
Committee (GOC), and the second called for a cease-fire.
The Committee was aided by a small group of military observers
from the staffs of the Consuls-General in Indonesia.
After the cease-fire had broken down several times, a
truce agreement was negotiated, with United Nations
assistance, in January 1948. This too broke down and
hostilities resumed during the final weeks of 1948. Further
resolutions were adopted by the Security Council between
24February and December 1948. In January 1949 the Security
Council again requested a cease-fire. For the first time it
made detailed proposals for a political solution, and
reconstituted the GOC with a complement of military observers
25as the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI).
During 1949 other resolutions were adopted concerning the 
financing of UNCI representatives and United Nations Observers 
in Indonesia. Agreement was reached in November 1949 for a 
Dutch transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, and after 
completing tasks connected with implementation of the transfer 
agreement, the United Nations mission was discharged in 1951.
24. SC Res. S/678 (28 February 1948). 
SC Res. S/1150 (24 December 1948) . 
SC Res. S/1165 (28 December 1948).
25. SC Res. S/1234 (28 January 1949).
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3. India and Pakistan.
Shortly after gaining their independence, India and
Pakistan divided between them some five hundred st cl b e g  ,
formerly under British sovereignty. One of these, Kashmir,
has been a source of hostilities since its Hindu ruler opted
in 1947 to attach his state to India. The Security Council
adopted a resolution and established a Commission composed
of representatives of three members of the United Nations,
one to be selected by India, one to be selected by Pakistan,
2 6and the third to be designated by the two so selected.
The Commission had a dual function. Firstly, it was to 
investigate the facts pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter 
of the United Nations. Secondly, it was to exercise, without 
interrupting the work of the Security Council, any mediatory 
influence likely to smooth away difficulties. The Security 
Council recommended various measures to end hostilities 
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, till a final decision 
by the people of Kashmir regarding their future could be 
reached. It was not until the detailed resolution of 21st 
April that authorisation was given to the United Nations
27Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to use observers.
The observers were finally established in Kashmir upon the 
signing on 27th July of the Karachi Agreement on a cease-fire. 
This was a direct bilateral agreement between India and 
Pakistan and was not voted on by the Security Council.
After the cease-fire which came into operation on 1st 
January 1949, the Commission felt the need for an independent
26. SC Res. S/654 (20 January 1948).
27. SC Res. S/726 (21 April 1948).
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source of information on the military situation, and as a 
result, General Delvoie of Belgium was appointed as its 
military adviser. He asked the Secretary-General•to furnish 
a sufficient number of military observers to enable him to 
observe the cease-fire. These came to be known later as the 
United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan 
(UNMOGIP). A few officers from Belgium, Canada, Mexico,
Norway and the United States were quickly dispatched to 
Kashmir, headed by the Commission's Military Adviser, and, in 
close co-operation with the military authorities of the two 
parties, watched over the cease-fire and prevented minor 
incidents from getting out of hand. At the end of 1949 the 
Commission which had failed to make any progress towards 
securing the conditions which had been agreed to be necessary 
for conduct of the plebiscite reported that it should be 
replaced by a single person, and on 14th March 1950 the 
Security Council transferred its responsibilities to a UN 
Representative, Sir Owen Dixon of Australia. The 
Representative and the Secretary-General then agreed that the 
military adviser should report directly to the Secretary- 
General. In March 1951, the Security Council appointed a new 
Representative, Mr Frank Graham of the United States, and 
decided that the military observer group should continue to 
supervise the cease-fire. This was the first occasion on 
which the military adviser and his observers were formally 
recognised as having at least a semi-autonomous existence.
UNMOGIP has been able to deal with civilian 
infringements of the line, and to prevent minor incidents.
It has been able to act with more efficiency on account of the
26
fact that both the Indian and Pakistan forces have usually
been willing that quiet should be maintained in Kashmir.
UNMOGIP could do nothing to check the entry of armed
infiltrators into Indian-held Kashmir in August 1965, which
led to the outbreak of full-scale hostilities in September.
The matter was soon brought before the Security Council for
action after the parties ignored its calls for a cease-fire
during the first week of September. The Council used
exceptionally strong language and, with the consent of the
United States and the Soviet Union, demanded a cease-fire and
a subsequent withdrawal of military forces. The Council
delegated to the Secretary-General the responsibility for
assisting in the supervision of the cease-fire agreement. He
strengthened the existing UN observers in Kashmir (UNMOGIP)
and created a new group, the United Nations India-Pakistan
Observation Mission (UNIPOM), which commenced operations in
2 8late September 1965. General B.F. Macdonald of Canada was 
appointed Chief Officer and the group consisted of 90 unarmed 
military observers drawn from 10 countries in addition to 25 
from other UN operations. Its mandate was to observe, 
investigate and report on compliance with the Security 
Council's demands concerning the 1,000 miles long 
international frontier. Along the 500 mile cease-fire line 
in Kashmir, the same tasks were to be carried out by UNMOGIP 
which was already on the spot.
28. SC Res. 209 (4 September 1965). 
SC Res. 210 (6 September 1965). 
SC Res. 211 (20 September 1965).
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The creation of UNIPOM led to some difficulties with 
the Indian Government, which had informed the UN that it would 
not allow such a force in Indian territory; therefore, the 
cease-fire and withdrawal should be supervised by a single 
body. But the Secretary-General clarified that he could not 
attach observers outside Kashmir to UNMOGIP, unless Pakistan 
agreed, which she did not. India replied that she could not 
be expected to help pay for UNIPOM. Moreover, France and the 
Soviet Union began to complain that in its establishment and 
control the Secretary-General had taken too much upon himself, 
and so had usurped the proper functions of the Security 
Council. The Secretary-General emphasised that the withdrawal 
from Kashmir and India and Pakistan would be treated as a 
single operation, and that the use of two bodies, which were 
to act in close co-operation, was only an administrative matter. 
Consequently, India decided not to pursue her objections.
General Marambio of Chile was appointed to arrange a 
meeting between India and Pakistan to negotiate plans for 
withdrawal, and was able to begin a series of meetings with 
military representatives of both sides. He announced, five 
days after the signature of the Tashkent agreement, that 
settlement had been reached for withdrawal plans. Everything 
went accordingly, and by 25th February the withdrawal had been 
completed. UNIPOM was then discharged within three weeks, 
while UNMOGIP was gradually reduced and has continued its role 
in Kashmir.
4. The Observer Group in Lebanon.
In 1958, a very tense situation occurred in Lebanon. The 
problem, though affected by external factors, was essentially
28
a domestic one. Early in 1958 there were rumours that
President Chamoun of Lebanon was planning to amend the
Constitution to open the way to his re-election, but
dissatisfaction with his policies led to a serious situation.
The assassination of an editor of a Beirut newspaper which
was severely critical of the Chamoun regime led to
disturbances which spread quickly. Lebanon alleged UAR
interference, and complained to both the Arab League and the
Security Council. In the Arab League a resolution acceptable
to the Lebanese delegation was drafted, but was rejected by
the Lebanese Government. In New York, the Lebanese Foreign
Minister asked for the protection of the United Nations. On
11th June the Security Council authorised the establishment of
the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) to ensure
that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply
29of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders. In 
this way Lebanon would be assured that there was no outside 
interference from Syria in its affairs.
The Security Council authorised the Secretary-General to 
take appropriate steps to establish the Observation Group. He 
was able to take advantage of the presence in the area of the 
UN Truce Supervision Organization, and the first observers 
arrived in Beirut on 12th June 1958. A three-man committee 
was appointed to head the Group: Galo Plaza, a former
president of Ecuador; Rajeshwar Dayal, an Indian diplomat; 
and Major-General Odd Bull of Norway. In its report the Group 
asserted that there was very little doubt that the majority
29. SC Res. S/4022 (11 June 1958).
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of those opposing the government were Lebanese. Accordingly, 
the Lebanese Government described the Group's conclusion as 
misleading.
The Revolution in Iraq on 14th July produced an
emergency atmosphere in both the United States and Lebanon.
On 15th July, several thousand marines landed outside Beirut,
and the entire U.S. Sixth Fleet was moved to the Eastern
Mediterranean. The purpose of the landing was to prevent
deterioration of the western position in the Middle East,
because the situation in Iraq was expected to encourage the
opposition in Lebanon. The United States informed the
Security Council that its action should be seen as in keeping
with the spirit of the Council's resolution of 11th June, and
expressed its willingness to withdraw once the UN was able to
resume its task. In Lebanon the American landing was deplored
by many sectors of the Lebanese people. The Government
announced that there would be no attempt on its part to amend
the Constitution. A new President was elected, and Lebanon
returned to normal. The General Assembly welcomed the
assurances given by the Arab States that each member "shall
respect the systems of government established in the other
member states, and that each shall pledge to abstain from any
action calculated to change established systems of 
30government". The General Assembly requested also that the 
Secretary-General make arrangements to facilitate the early 
withdrawal of foreign troops from both Lebanon and Jordan.
As a result of the efforts which had been taken by the 
Secretary-General, UNOGIL was expanded to a total of 591
30. GA Res. 1237 (ES-111), 21 August 1958.
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observers by 14th November. The United States reached an 
agreement with the new Lebanese Government on 8th October for 
a total withdrawal, which was completed on 25th October. 
Although the General Assembly Resolution of August 1958 had 
spoken of arrangements to support Lebanon's independence once 
the foreign troops had left, the Secretary-General ordered 
the withdrawal of the Group from Lebanon immediately after 
the American withdrawal, and the last of its personnel left 
Lebanon on 9th December 1958.
5. The Challenge of the Congo.
The greatest and most complex challenge to the United
Nations in the peace-keeping field arose in the Congo. It has
been the Organization's largest operation without the use of
enforcement measures. A few days after the country gained
independence from Belgium on 30th June 1960 civil war and
public disorder erupted, and Belgian troops were rushed from
their bases in the Congo and neighbouring Rwanda Urundi in
order to protect lives and property of Belgians. The
Congolese Government objected to the Belgian intervention and
appealed on 12th July to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations for UN military assistance. The Security Council
authorised the Congo peace-keeping force, Operation des Nations
Unies au Congo (ONUC), to prevent outsiders from intervening
and to facilitate the withdrawal of the Belgian troops. The
Council called on Belgium to withdraw and authorised the
Secretary-General to provide the Congo with the necessary
military assistance till the national security forces should
31be able to meet their tasks.
31. SC Res. 143 (1960).
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ONUC was by far the largest, most complex, most costly, 
and most controversial UN operation. On 15th July the first 
UN troops arrived and by 17th July 3,500 men from four African 
countries were in the Congo. By the end of the year they 
reached 17,500 combat and 2,000 administrative troops from 9 
African, 2 Asian and 2 European countries - Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, 
Indonesia, Malaya, Ireland and Sweden.
On 9th August the Council passed another resolution, 
calling on Belgium to withdraw its troops immediately from the 
Province of Katanga under special arrangements made by the 
Secretary-General. The Belgian troops had left the Congo by 
the first week of September, but a few officers remained in 
Katanga on an individual basis. The UN Force was established 
to secure Belgium's withdrawal and to prevent foreign 
intervention, so the Congolese Government had asked the Soviet 
Union to be ready in case it might find it necessary to call 
for its assistance; later the Congo Prime Minister, Patrice 
Lumumba, threatened to appeal to the Soviet Union unless 
Belgian troops were out of the country within 24 hours.
On 5th September, Lumumba was deposed by Kasavubu. The 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo,
Mr Andrew Coridier, ordered major airports throughout the Congo 
to be closed to all traffic other than the UN's. He also 
ordered UN troops to take control of Leopoldville's radio 
station and closed it down. These moves could be argued in 
terms of Security Council resolution 146 of 1960. Accordingly, 
the Force "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in 
or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, 
constitutional or otherwise". The criticism of ONUC has in
32
general been that it was not neutral in this struggle.
Although ONUC refused, on 15 September 1960 and again on
11 October, to permit the arrest of Lumumba on a warrant
32issued under President Kasavubu's authority, it has been
said that ONUC's action in closing the Leopoldville radio
station and airport effectively denied to Lumumba the
possibility of appealing for popular support and ensured
33Kasavubu's triumph in the struggle for power. It is
believed, however, that, whether or not this was the eventual
result of this action, it was not the result intended by ONUC.
The intention of these actions, as subsequently explained by
34the Secretary-General was to prevent the outbreak of civil 
war which seemed likely had Lumumba been able to appeal to 
the people to take up arms against President Kasavubu's 
Government and to fly in from Kasai the troops loyal to 
Lumumba on the aircraft which the Soviet Union had provided.
As such the action was the only reasonable action ONUC could 
have taken. The Soviet Union furiously attacked the Secretary- 
General and ONUC's attitude. On 14th September General Mobutu 
of the Congolese Army announced that he had decided to depose 
both Lumumba and Kasavubu, and ordered the closing down of 
the communist embassies in the Congolese Capital.
The Soviet Union supported Lumumba and sought without 
success to remove the United Nations command which, in its 
view, supported Kasavubu. The Soviet Union vetoed a series
32. S/4505/Add.2 and S/4531, para 27.
33. W . Okumu, Lumumba's Congo: Roots of Conflict (1963), 
p.138.
34. Off. Rec. S.C. 890th Mtg., p.17.
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of resolutions calling on States to refrain from giving
military aid except through the United Nations. The Soviet
support of Lumumba opened the possibility of an internal
conflict, with the antagonists receiving support from
conflicting power groups. To avoid this situation, Ceylon
and Tunisia proposed in the Security Council a resolution that
would have permitted ONUC to act to restore order even though
the governmental authority in the Congo was divided. The
Soviet Union vetoed resolutions to accomplish this objective,
and the United States brought the Congo problem before a
special session of the General Assembly. On 20 September 1960
it passed a resolution, which appealed to all Congolese to
solve their internal conflicts by peaceful means "with the
assistance... of Asian and African representatives appointed by
the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the
35Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation." The 
Conciliation Commission established under this resolution was 
of relatively little importance to the history of the Congo.
It arrived in the Congo on 3 January 1961 and submitted its 
report to the General Assembly on 21 March 1961. The 
Conciliation Commission was intended to consist of 
representatives from each state serving on the Advisory 
Committee on the Congo and appointed by the Advisory Committee 
in consultation with the Secretary-General. These states were 
Ethiopia, the Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, 
Indonesia, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, 
Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic. However, Guinea,
35. UN General Assembly, Official Records, Fourth Emergency 
Special Session, Annexes, Res. 1474 (ES-IV), A/4510,
20 September 1960.
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Indonesia, Mali and the United Arab Republic, because of the 
hostility of President Kasavubu, withdrew from the Advisory 
Committee and therefore were not represented on the Commission. 
ONUC had the double task of excluding outside intervention on 
the one hand and the internal policing of a huge area on the 
other. Nevertheless the Secretary-General took the view that 
the principles he had laid down for UNEF in the Middle-East 
were equally valid for ONUC. The Secretary-General told the
O f .Security Council on 13th July 1960 "The United Nations Force
would not be authorized to action beyond self-defence... They
were not to take any action which would make them a party to
internal conflicts. The selection of personnel should be such
as to avoid complications because of the nationalities used...
This does not... exclude the use of units from African States,
...while it does exclude troops from any of the permanent
members of the Security Council." This meaning was confirmed
in the leaflet distributed by Dr Bunche and General von Horn
37to all members of ONUC on their arrival in the Congo. "You 
serve as members of an international force. It is a peace 
force, not a fighting force. The United Nations has asked you 
to come here in response to an appeal from the Government of 
the Republic of the Congo. Your task is to help in restoring 
order and calm in this country which has been so troubled 
recently. You are to be friendly to all the people of this 
country. Protection against acts of violence is to be given
36. SC Official Records - 15th Year - 873rd meeting, 13 July 
1960, p.5.
37. Waters, Maurice, 'The United Nations, International 
Organization and Administration', p.408.
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to all the people, white and black. You carry arms, but they 
are to be used only in self-defence. You are in the Congo to 
help everyone, to harm no one." As might be expected the 
first principle to come under strain was the ban on the use 
of force to affect the military or political outcome of the 
situation. In a country where the army was rebellious any 
peace-force was bound to find itself in a very delicate 
position. The issue of force or no force merged into the issue 
of interference or non-interference. In practice non­
interference was less possible than abstention from force.
The factional fighting inside the Congo and the 
intervention from outside complicated the Congo operation.
ONUC was a predominantly African force. It was necessary to 
secure the moral backing of Africa, but it was impossible for 
such a force to be completely disinterested, because each 
contributing state had strong views on every Congo issue.
Thus when ONUC prevented Lumumba from using the radio station 
and airports, in September 1960, three States (Guinea, Ghana 
and the UAR) threatened to withdraw their troops and claimed a 
right to place them at Lumumba's disposal. From this, the 
conclusion might be drawn that absence of a permanent UN force 
gives an advantage in the UN to small countries, since it 
enables those of them who provide contingents to exert 
influence upon the direction of peace-keeping operation.
ONUC had found itself in direct confrontation with the 
host government, which sometimes tried to impose impossible 
conditions on it. These led the Secretary-General to issue the 
following interpretation of their relations. "The relation 
between the UN and the Government of the Republic of the Congo
36
is not merely a contractual relationship in which the
Republic can impose its conditions as host State and thereby
determine the circumstances under which the UN operates. It
is rather a relationship governed by mandatory decisions of
the Security Council. Only the Security Council can decide
on the discontinuance of the operation and therefore
conditions which, by their effect on the operation, would
deprive it of its necessary basis, would require direct
3 8consideration of the Security Council."
The UN was preoccupied with the question of Katanga, 
where it was employing armed forces in a direct endeavour to 
topple the regime. On 11th July 1960, when the province of 
Katanga declared its indpendence, the secessionist regime 
headed by Tshombe was not formally recognised by any member 
of the United Nations. Lumumba insisted that ONUC forces 
should take all necessary steps to re-establish the Central 
Government's authority in Katanga. The Security Council (Res. 
143-1960) had decided to give the Government military 
assistance to help in restoring order. There was a widespread 
feeling among UN members that UN troops ought to be deployed 
in all parts of the Congo, but Tshombe declared that there 
was no need for them in Katanga and he was ready to use his 
force to keep the UN out. In August 1960 the Security Council 
(Res. 146-1960) declared that the entry of the UN Force into 
Katanga was necessary and clarified that the Force would not 
intervene in internal conflict.
The Secretary-General was able to convince Mr Tshombe as 
to the interpretation of the Council's resolution and
38. UN Document S/4389/Add.5.
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consequently the UN took over the task of securing order in
39Katanga. But the death of Lumumba produced a very bitter 
Afro-Asian reaction against the conduct of the UN operation. 
Thus the Security Council passed, on 21st February 1961, a 
resolution (Res. 161-1961) urging the UN to take all measures 
to prevent civil v\/ar in the Congo using force, if necessary, 
as a last resort.
This procedure in effect nullified the paragraph of the
resolution of 9 August 1960 "that the United Nations force in
the Congo will not be party to or in any way intervene in or
be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict,
constitutional or otherwise." Thus for the first time the UN
changed its policy that peace-keeping activities were to
involve the use of force only in self-defence. The turning
point of the operation was the above-mentioned resolution
passed on 21st February 1961. From this point on, the Security
Council furnished the main guidelines: reorganisation of
Congolese armed units and elimination of interference by such
units in the political life of the Congo; withdrawal of all
Belgian and other foreign military and political advisers not
40under the United Nations Command; and opposition to the
41secessionist activities in Katanga. The Secretary-General 
was authorised to take vigorous action, including the use of 
force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention
39. On 27 November 1960 Lumumba sought to travel from 
Leopoldville, where the United Nations had provided him 
with physical protection within the confines of his home, 
to Stanleyville, where his supporters had control. He 
was caught by the Kasavubu forces and arrested on 2 
December. On 17 January 1961, he was placed in an 
airplane and delivered to the Katanga secessionist regime, 
where he was murdered.
40. UN Security Council 942 meeting, 21 February 1961, S/4741.
41. UN Security Council 982 meeting, 24 November 1961, S/4741.
38
pending legal action and deportation of all foreign military
and para-military personnel and political advisers not under
the United Nations Command to prevent the return of such
elements. The steps taken by the Secretary-General were both
political and military. This new policy was not accepted
clearly by every one. Britain, for instance, although voting
in its favour, made it clear that there was no question of
empowering the United Nations forces to impose a political
settlement. It met with strong criticism in a number of other
countries. In face of these pressures the Secretary-General
agreed to hold cease-fire talks with Tshombe, but he was killed
when his aircraft crashed on the way to the meeting. In
November U Thant was appointed as acting Secretary-General,
and on 24th November 1961 the Security Council passed a
resolution authorising the Secretary-General "to take vigorous
action, including the use of the requisite measure of force,
if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending
and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary
personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations
42Command, and mercenaries." The Council condemned Katanga's 
secession and declared its full support for the Central 
Government's efforts to maintain the Congo's integrity.
In December the Secretary-General authorised the Force to 
proceed with its operation. Tshombe's forces were unable to 
resist successfully and he therefore agreed to mediation. On 
21st December Tshombe signed a declaration which put an end to 
Katanga's secession and in June he left the country. The 
Secretary-General insisted that the aim of the December
42. SC Res. 169 (1961).
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operation was not to impose a political settlement on the 
Congo. But there was no doubt that such policy had weakened, 
at least, the secessionist regime. Early in 1962 the UN 
agreed to help the Central Government in bringing down the 
secessionist regime which was based on the Orientale Province 
of the Congo.
The UN was participating in the Congo's political affairs 
by supporting the authority of the Central Government. 
Therefore, ONUC cannot be considered as a simple peace-keeping 
operation; it had some characteristics of a mandatory 
enforcement action. The ONUC remained in the Congo until 
June 1964.
6. The Disengagement in Yemen.
At the end of September 1962 the royalist regime in Yemen
was overthrown. Civil war began between the republicans and
the royalists but soon became more than just an internal
conflict. At the request of the new republic the UAR began to
send troops, while the royalists received arms from
neighbouring Saudi Arabia. Secretary-General U Thant had been
consulting with the countries involved in the activities *
The UN the Secretary-General reported to the Security
Council that his consultations with the various interested
parties had resulted in the acceptance of a disengagement
4 3agreement in Yemen. The Security Council adopted a 
resolution^ "Noting with satisfaction the initiative of the
43. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council 
concerning developments relating to Yemen. S/5298,
29 April 1963, p.33.
SC Res. S/5331, 11 June 1963.44 .
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Secretary-General mentioned in his report of April 1963 
(S/5298)...requests the Secretary-General to establish the 
observation operation as defined by him... Urges the parties 
concerned to observe fully the terms of disengagement set out 
in the report of 29th April and to refrain from any action 
which would increase tensions in the area." It was agreed 
that a demilitarised zone should be established to a depth of 
20 kilometres on each side of the border and that the 
disengagement process should be confirmed by UN or other 
impartial observers.
The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council 
that the size of the observation team which would be needed 
would not be more than 200 for a period of four months. He 
thought that the two states involved would divide its cost 
between them. The UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was 
dispatched as a basis for the disengagement of the UAR and 
Saudi Arabia from the affairs of Yemen. This operation was not 
given any peace-keeping functions. Its role was to observe and 
report. Its terms of reference gave it a more restricted range 
of activity than UNTSO, UNIPOM, UNEF or ONUC, and it had no 
mediation or conciliation functions. The UNYOM, consisting of 
100 Yugoslav officers and men transferred from UNEF and a 
Canadian air unit of about 50 persons, began its activity on 
4th July 1963. The observers carried arms for self-defence.
The frontier was difficult to observe because it was about 
400 miles long and in very rugged country. Since the 
disengagement agreement involved only Saudi Arabia and the UAR, 
UNYOM was not concerned with other Governments and bordering 
territories. It was not given authority to issue any 
political or military directives. Only later (November 1963)
41
did the Secretary-General appoint a Special Representative in
Yemen, Mr P. Spinelli, who tried to shift the emphasis of the
Mission from military to political tasks.
When it appeared that the agreement which the UNYOM was
supposed to supervise was not being executed, Saudi Arabia
declared its intention to refuse to renew its earlier
agreement to pay for the extension of UNYOM's life for a
further two months, but changed its mind and UNYOM was
retained. UNYOM's life was extended for several more two
monthly periods after informal consultation with the members
45of the Security Council. But the force was unable to carry
out its mission because of its limited numbers and the wide
rugged area it was covering, so although fighting had not
ceased, the Secretary-General asked in September 1964 for the
46termination of UNYOM. Fighting in Yemen continued for almost 
three years after its departure. Only on 31st August 1967 did 
the UAR and Saudi Arabia agree to stop interfering in Yemen, 
and the UAR troops left Yemen in December 1967.
7. Peace-Keeping in Cyprus.
In Cyprus the UN attempted mediation in an internal 
dispute with international repercussions. The Turkish Cypriot 
minority formed about twenty percent of the island's population 
of about 620,000, and in the Zurich and London Agreements of 
February 1959, they were given 30 percent of posts in the
45. S/5447, Report by the Secretary-General to the Security
Council on the functioning of UNYOM, 28 October 1963, p.50. 
S/5959, Report by the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the termination of UNYOM, 11 September 1964.
46.
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legislature, civil service, and police, and 40 percent of 
those in the army, while the Turkish Vice-President was given 
a veto in matters of defence and foreign policy, and both 
union with Greece and partition were forbidden. The 
provisions which protected the Turks often proved difficult 
to implement after independence was gained in 1960. The crisis 
began when President Makarios announced that he intended to 
put forward certain constitutional amendments. On 21st 
December 1963 fighting broke out in Nicosia and quickly spread 
throughout the island. On 15th February 1964 both Britain and 
Cyprus asked for an early meeting of the Security Council.
This took place on 4th March, and it recommended that an 
international force be established. The Secretary-General, 
in agreement with the four countries concerned, designated a 
mediator to promote a peaceful and agreed settlement. The 
Mediator, Mr Galo Plaza, ex-President of Ecuador, submitted a 
report to the Secretary-General in which he suggested that the 
Greeks should agree to put the question of enosis (union with 
Greece) on one side, and that the Turks should reconsider their 
insistence on the geographical separation of the two 
communities under a federal system of government. He proposed 
that the UN should act as the guarantor of any settlement and 
establish a Commissioner in Cyprus to supervise its observance. 
After the report was made public, the Turks refused to have 
anything more to do with the Mediator. At the end of 1964 he 
resigned, and since that time the UN's mediation function has 
been in suspension.
The UN force in Cyprus was established in accordance with 
the Security Council resolution of 4th March 1964 providing 
for the creation of a "United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in
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Cyprus" the function of which was "in the interest of
preserving international peace and security, to use its best
efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary
to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and
47order and a return to normal conditions." The Security
Council's resolution recognised the Cyprus crisis as a threat
to international peace, thus creating a basis for UN
intervention. It authorised a peace-keeping force of 7,000
for three months, with the task of preventing further fighting
and restoring law and order, when required. It was sent not
to an international frontier but to an internal and unofficial
line dividing the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. The Force had
no mandate to settle the problem; that task lay with a UN
mediator. U Thant on several occasions warned that the success
of UNFICYP in maintaining peace in Cyprus should not lead to
failure of the effort to obtain a political solution, and
stressed that a United Nations force should not be called upon
to maintain indefinitely an obviously unsatisfactory status
quo. He pointed out that "the capacity of the United Nations
to settle disputes or promote constructive and peaceful
solutions to disputes is as much - perhaps even more - in need
of study as the problems of peace-keeping. The tendency of
peace-keeping operations, originally set up as temporary
expedients, to assume semi-permanent character because no
progress is made in setting the basic causes of conflict is a
serious reflection on the capacity of the United Nations to
settle disputes even when these disputes have been brought to
48the United Nations by the parties directly concerned." The
47. SC Res. 186 (1964).
48. Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General 
on the work of the Organization, 16 June 1966 to 15 June 
1967.
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Security Council kept UNFICYP on a short leash, initially by 
successive authorisations of only three months at a time, and 
then from June 1965 for six-month periods. The main role of 
the Force was to try to place itself between the Greek and 
Turkish military positions, or in the best and nearest 
locations. It patrols the main roads, villages and towns in 
disputed areas, and in case of firing, is required to attempt 
to bring it to an end by peaceful means. Its members are 
permitted to use arms, to the minimum extent necessary, against 
attacks on themselves, or on UNFICYP's premises, posts and 
vehicles, and are entitled to resist any attempt to force them 
to withdraw from positions occupied under orders.
However, the Secretary-General regarded these powers as 
49insufficient. He proposed to instruct UNFICYP's Commander 
that the Force must have complete freedom in certain 
circumstances to remove positions and fortifications and to 
ask for separation of the opposing military forces. The 
Security Council did not prevent the Secretary-General from 
acting as he requested. A separate vote was taken on Paragraph 
4 of the above-mentioned resolution, asking the Secretary- 
General to establish the composition and size of the force in 
consultation with the governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. 
The Soviet, Czech and French representatives abstained- from the 
separate vote on Paragraph 4, arguing that investing the 
Secretary-General with these powers was far beyond his 
authority, but they subsequently voted for the entire 
resolution. It was agreed that costs should be met by the 
governments providing the contingents, by Cyprus, and by 
voluntary contributions.
49. UN Document S/5950, para 232.
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For the first time a permanent member of the Security 
Council - the United Kingdom - was invited to supply a 
contingent with other personnel coming from Austria, Sweden, 
Denmark, Canada, Finland and Ireland.
UNFICYP has been able to decrease tension in many 
situations, prevent fighting from getting out of hand, and 
solve many problems. There is always the possibility the 
UNFICYP can do a great deal to prevent an accidental war, but 
it is powerless in face of a prepared war.
Fighting broke out again in 1967, bringing Greece and 
Turkey to the brink of war before Athens removed General 
George Grivas, who had returned to Cyprus to pursue the EOKA 
dream of enosis. Early in 1974 Archbishop Makarios made a 
concerted effort to send home the Greek officers commanding 
the island's National Guard, claiming that they had been 
encouraging conspiracies against him. On 15th July 1974 the 
Greek-officered Cyprus National Guard launched a coup, and a 
former EOKA member, Nicos Sampson, was sworn in as President.
It was announced that Archbishop Makarios was dead, but he 
had in fact escaped to London.
On 20th July, Turkey invaded Cyprus. The Turkish Prime 
Minister Mr Ecevit claimed that Turkey's new military 
offensive in Cyprus was legal and within its rights as a 
guarantor of the island's independence, and pledged that 
Turkish troops would not take control of territory in excess 
of what would be a fair area for the Turkish population of 
the island.
After personal appeals to Greek and Turkish leaders by 
the US Secretary of State, Dr Kissinger, both sides agreed to 
a cease-fire under the Security Council Resolution. In Geneva,
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UN officials and military representatives of Britain, Turkey 
and Greece signed an agreement setting out cease-fire 
demarcation lines in Cyprus. The Security Council in an 
emergency session unanimously approved a resolution demanding 
a halt to the fighting and resumption of peace talks. The 
Council's resolution deeply deplored the resumption of 
fighting and declared this to be contrary to the provision 
of the cease-fire approved before. The resolution reaffirmed 
the cease-fire call in all its terms and urged the parties to 
implement them without delay.
The peace-keeping force remained in the island to 
maintain peace and security.
8. The Council's Role in the 1973 Middle East Crisis.
The Security Council was able to end the October 1973 
war between the Arab States and Israel, and to deploy UN 
emergency forces between the belligerents on both the Egyptian 
and Syrian fronts. The Council decided in its Resolution 340 
of the 25th of October 1973 to set up under its authority a 
United Nations Emergency Force, and under Resolution 341 of 
27th October 1973 to set up that Force for an initial period 
of six months.
The Security Council created a new peace-keeping
operation, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
50(UNDOF), between Syria and Israel.
The detente made it possible for the Security Council to 
regain its ability to serve the purposes of the Charter. In 
recognition of the difficulties in securing Great Power 
agreement within the Security Council - during the cold war
50. SC, 1774th meeting, 31 May 1974.
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period - the General Assembly initiated positive action. In 
fact, the General Assembly had played a more important role 
in peace-keeping operations in the Middle East since 1956. 
Therefore the role of the Security Council in 1973 Middle 
East crises will be discussed in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
The Role of the General Assembly
The specific functions of the General Assembly are to 
discuss any matter within the scope of the Charter and to make
recommendations thereon either to the members of the United
. 51Nations or to the Security Council or to both, but this is
subject to the provision that it must refer to the Security
Council any question relating to the international peace on
52which action is necessary, and that it may not make any
recommendation on a dispute or situation which is being dealt
53with by the Security Council. At San Francisco the Smaller 
Powers engaged in various and successful efforts to extend
/
the competence of the General Assembly beyond the terms 
contained in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The competence of 
the General Assembly was widened particularly in Articles 10,
11 and 14. Accordingly, the General Assembly has the power 
'to discuss any question relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security' and to 'make recommendations 
with regard to any such questions' but 'any such question on 
which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security 
Council'; it has the power to make recommendations 'on any 
questions or any matters within the scope of the present 
Charter' and in the peaceful adjustment of any situation likely 
to cause deterioration in good relations among nations, and it 
'may consider the general principles of cooperation in the 
maintenance of international peace and security.'
51. Article 10 of the UN Charter.
52. Article 11, para 2.
53. Article 12, para 1.
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The Security Council is more likely to confine itself 
to dealing with specific situations related to the maintenance 
of peace and security, which require swiftness of action and 
about which the permanent members are able to achieve some 
measure of agreement. Any development of relations between 
the major powers would bring about an increase in the 
effectiveness of the Security Council; it would also reduce 
the anxiety of the major powers to turn to the General Assembly 
for political propaganda reasons. But with any deterioration 
in the relation between the major powers the General Assembly 
will be more concerned rather than the Council, because the 
voting system will not permit the proper functioning of the 
Security Council. But, concentration of attention upon the 
voting procedure of the Council as an explanation of its 
weakness seems somewhat untrue, since the real cause lies 
beyond that. It reflects the balance of relations among the 
permanent members of the Council. The primary cause of the 
decline of the Security Council role must be sought in the 
breakdown since 1945 of the wartime alliance of the United 
States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, since the establishment of the UN, there 
has been an increasing trend, which indicated the inability of 
the Security Council to serve the purposes of the Charter, and 
there were growing preferences of Members to deal with the 
General Assembly. This trend has been accompanied by the 
gradual breakdown of the lines of functional separation between 
the Security Council, drawn up at Dumbarton Oaks, by the 
gradual assumption by the General Assembly of an active role 
in the maintenance of international peace and security. The 
first development of the General Assembly is the role begun in
50
the first year of the United Nations. After the failure of
the Security Council to take action with respect to the Franco
regime in Spain, the question was brought to the attention of
54the General Assembly which recommended in the matter. In
1947, Greece's complaint against her northern neighbours for
assisting guerrilla activities was brought to the General
Assembly after the Security Council had become deadlocked and
had removed the matter from its agenda. The Assembly
recommended that Members refrain from action which might assist
55any armed group fighting against the Greek Government.
The major step in the development of the Assembly's role 
in police action came with the adoption of the 'Uniting for 
Peace' resolution on 3 November 1950. With the return of the 
Soviet Union representative to the Security Council on 1 August 
1950, it became apparent that the Council could no longer 
achieve its responsibilities of directing the collective 
measures that were being taken to repel the North Korean armed 
attack, and restore international peace and security in the 
area. The United States therefore proposed that the General 
Assembly assume the responsibility of dealing with such 
situations when the Security Council was prevented by the veto 
from acting. The United States proposal, with some minor 
changes, was adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 377(V) 
of 3 November 1950. The General Assembly has tried to deal 
with the situation in its 'Uniting for Peace' resolution.
Under the terms of the resolution the General Assembly asserted 
its competence in case of failure of the Security Council to
54. GA Res. 39(1) 12 December 1946.
55. GA Res. 193(111) 27 November 1948.
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discharge its responsibilities; it declares that this failure
does not relieve members of their obligations or the United
Nations of its responsibility under the Charter for the
maintenance of peace and security, and goes on to provide
that in the event of such a failure whenever there appears to
be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, the General Assembly shall make appropriate
recommendations to members for collective measures including
the use of armed force if necessary. The resolution also set
up a Peace Observation Commission to report on the situation
in any area of international tension.
The General Assembly was to exercise this 'residual
responsibility' only after the Council had failed to take
action and had removed the item from its agenda. Thus, the
relationship between the Council and the Assembly was
explicitly re-defined to transfer the consideration of an
alleged threat to peace or breach of the peace to the General
Assembly. Thus the way was prepared for making the Council's
'primary responsibility' largely inconsiderable, unless the
permanent members were in full accord. Hammarskjöld believed
that the General Assembly possessed the authority to consider
threats to the peace only if the Security Council had discussed
them and had been unable to act on them.
The Assembly may recommend, it may investigate, it may 
pronounce Judgment, but it does not have the power to 
compel compliance with its decisior^4 Under the Charter 
only the Security Council has the power to order the
use of force....
'It is worth recalling that the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, 
in establishing a procedure intended to safeguard the
56. Wilder Foote (ed.), Servant of Peace: A Selection of the
Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary- 
General of the United Nations 1953-61, p.142.
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application of the relevant provisions of the Charter - Articles 
10, 11 and 51 - in support of the maintenance of peace, did not 
constitutionally transfer to the General Assembly any of the 
enforcement powers reserved to the Security Council by the 
Charter.'^
The developing role of the General Assembly as a substitute
for the Council, was not beyond dispute. It could be argued that
it is not in accordance with the Charter system of collective
security. We could also say that such a possible development was
expected at San Francisco in case the major powers did not
cooperate, and that Article 10 was adopted with this end in view.*
For the Soviet Union, the 'primary responsibility' as mentioned in
Article 24 is equal to 'exclusive responsibility'. In May 1965
Soviet Ambassador Ferdorenko said that 'the Security Council has
sole power under the Charter to decide all questions concerned
with taking action for the maintenance of international peace and
security, which includes operations using United Nations armed
forces'. For the Soviets, all units of military character can be
authorised only by the Security Council, without any distinction
58between peace-keeping or enforcement forces. The United 
States acknowledged in June 1965 that 'the Security Council 
should, as it had normally done in the past, authorize future 
peace-keeping operations. However, the General Assembly should 
assume that responsibility in appropriate cases whenever
57. Ibid., p.145.
*K.P. Saksena, The United Nations and Collective Security, A 
Historical Analysis. Delhi, 1974, pp.38-40. Leland M. Goodrich 
and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and
Documents. Boston, 1949, p.95. Routh B. Russell and Jeanette E. 
Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter. Washington, 
1958, p.750.
58. Arthur M. Cox, Prospects for Peace-Keeping, p.106, and 
International Information Center on Peace-Keeping Operations 
I.P.K.O. documents. Paris I (F 1967), No.17.
53
enforcement measures were not involved. As Dag Hammarskjöld
had stated in 1957, enforcement action by the United Nations
under Chapter VII of the Charter continued to be reserved to
59the Security Council....1
The main question is whether the General Assembly may
authorise peace-keeping operations when the Security Council
is prevented from doing so by the veto. For the US the word
'action' in Article 11 means only enforcement action;^ this
interpretation has been supported by the International Court 
61of Justice. For the French, forces may be authorised by the
General Assembly only if they are restricted to the performance
6 2of observation, supervision or inquiry functions. The 
conflicting viewpoints have hardened, but the authorisation 
issue has become less critical. In May 1966, Swedish 
Ambassador Astrom advised publicly in the Special Committee on 
Peacekeeping Operations 'to put aside for the time being the 
problem of the relative competence of the Security Council and 
the General Assembly' because there was no reason to believe 
that differing views could be settled and because it was 
unclear whether any useful purpose would be served by laying
down, in advance, more precise rules for the problems of
. 63competence.
The General Assembly authorised three main operations: 
UNSCOB, UNEF and UNTEA.
59. Ibid,, p.106.
60. I.P.K.O. Documents, ibid., No.19.
61. International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the 
United Nations, Article 17, para 2 of the Charter, 
Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962.
62. I.P.K.O. Documents, ibid., No.18.
63. Arthur M. Cox, ibid., p.108.
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1. The Peace Commission on the Balkans.
On 3 December 1946 Greece asked the Security Council for
consideration of the situation in northern Greece resulting
from aid allegedly provided to Greek guerrillas by Albania,
64Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. On 19 December the Council
established a commission of investigation composed of one
representative for each member of the Council for 1947, to
ascertain the causes and nature of the alleged border
violations and to make proposals for averting a repetition.
But after the United States intervention in Greece and Turkey
(The Truman Doctrine, March 1947) the Soviet Union blocked
further consideration of the case. On 15 September, the
Council removed the case from its agenda and it was taken up
by the General Assembly, which called on Albania, Bulgaria and
6 5Yugoslavia to do nothing to aid the Greek guerrillas. It 
asked those three countries and Greece to cooperate in settling 
their disputes through the establishment of normal diplomatic 
relations, frontier conventions and cooperation in solving 
refugee and minority problems. The Assembly established an 
eleven-member United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans 
(UNSCOB); it consisted of representatives of Australia, Brazil, 
China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, seats being held open 
for Poland and the Soviet Union, to observe the compliance by 
the four Governments concerned and to assist them in complying 
with its recommendations. UNSCOB's mandate was successively
64. UN Security Council, Official Records, First Year, Second 
Series, No.28, 19 December 1946, pp.700-01.
65. GA Res. 109(11) 21 October 1947.
66. Ibid.
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continued until 1951 when it was substituted by a Balkan
6 7Subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission (POC).
The Peace Observation Commission was established in accordance
of the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution of 1950.
The Subcommission observers continued to report on the
Greek situation until 1954 when the group was withdrawn at
Greece's request. What is important to notice is that UNSCOB
found that professional military officers were invaluable as
an observer group in assessing the highly complicated and
fluctuating situation. It also requested operating funds from
the Secretary-General so as to safeguard the international
6 8character of the operation. But that request exceeded the
Assembly's appropriations for UNSCOB, that a major part of its
expenses had to be provided by the participating Governments.
The Soviet Union requested that no portion of its budgetary
69contribution should be used to defray UNSCOB expenses. The
70United States supplied logistical support for the mission.
UNSCOB had authority from the General Assembly to use its 
good offices and mediate between the parties. It encouraged 
bilateral discussions between Greece and its northern 
neighbours. UNSCOB, even though rebuffed by the northern 
neighbours of Greece, continued its efforts to communicate 
with them. The committee received indirectly from the 
Secretary-General the complaints against Greece made by
67. GA Res. 508(VI) A and B, 7 December 1951.
68. UN General Assembly, A/415 (Mimeo) 18 October 1947.
69. The Soviet Union did not take up its membership in UNSCOB 
according to GA Res. 109(11) of 21 October 1947.
70. UN General Assembly, A/521 (Mimeo) 9 January 1948, p.33.
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Albania and Bulgaria directly to the Secretary-General.
Yugoslav complaints were made directly to Greece and never
reached UNSCOB. The most important activities of UNSCOB were
the operations of the observer teams. The members of these
teams acted as individuals and seldom called for instructions
from their governments. Their reports went to UNSCOB and
were generally included as attachments to the UNSCOB report
without any comment. The shift from a pattern of a group of
instructed delegates to a group of individuals became even
more apparent when UNSCOB turned its functions over to the 
-JrPOC. The POC formed a subcommission of five states which at 
the request of the Greek Government dispatched six observers 
to Greece. The observers reported both to the Secretary- 
General and to the POC. In fact, the reports of the observers 
were circulated directly by the General Assembly to the UN 
members, in effect separating the observers from both the POC 
and its subcommission. When the General Assembly created 
UNSCOB it clarified two possible methods of operation: (1)
observation on both sides of the line and mediation if the 
northern neighbours of Greece co-operated; (2) observation on 
one side of the line if the co-operation of the northern 
neighbours of Greece did not materialise. Thus, the functions 
of UNSCOB were always clearly defined.
2. The Emergency Force in the Middle East.
On 24 October 1956, Israel invaded Egypt. Two days later 
Britain and France started to invade Egypt, and their forces 
had progressed along the Suez Canal to a distance of some 23 
miles before a cease-fire came into operation at midnight on 
6 November. The crisis had first been considered by the 
h. ss } .2..
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Security Council, where, on 30 October, Britain and France 
vetoed a resolution calling on Israel to withdraw and on all 
members to refrain from the use or threat of force. On the 
following day the Council decided to convene an Emergency 
Special Session of the Assembly which, on 2 November, adopted 
an American-sponsored resolution urging an immediate cease­
fire and a halt to the movement of military forces and arms 
into the area. On 4 November 1956 the General Assembly 
endorsed a Canadian suggestion that the Secretary-General be 
asked to submit, within 48 hours, a plan for the establishment
’within the consent of the nations concerned' of a force to
71'secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.'
Hammarskjöld reported on the matter and as a result the
Assembly, on 5 November, decided to establish 'a United Nations
72Command for an emergency international force,' 'to secure and
supervise the cessation of hostilities....' On 7 November it
approved the Secretary-General's second report, which concerned
73its organisation and functioning.
Egypt raised some questions about UNEF's character and 
composition, but the Force started to arrive on 15 November and 
by the end of the month 2,500 men were on duty. Two months 
later it had been increased to 6,000 officers and soldiers 
drawn from ten of the members who had offered to supply 
contingents: they were Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark,
Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. It 
took up its position in March on the Egyptian side of the 
Egyptian-Israeli international frontier and the Armistice
71. GA Res. 998 (ES-1), 3 November 1956.
72. GA Res. 1000 (ES-1), 5 November 1956.
73. GA Res. 1001 (ES-1), 7 November 1956.
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Demarcation line, and remained there till May 1967. The
Representative of Canada, Mr Lester Pearson, in his speech to
the General Assembly, spoke of the desirability of the UN
sending a force to maintain quiet between Israel and Egypt
while a political settlement was being worked out. He was
encouraged by the United States and others to go ahead with
his proposal, and the UNEF was established. On 24 November
the General Assembly called for immediate compliance with its
resolutions. On 3 December Britain and France notified the
Secretary-General that their troops would be withdrawn without
delay, and the operation was completed by 22 December. UNEF
played a very useful role immediately after its arrival, when
tension was high; it took up its position between the Anglo-
French and Egyptian forces and so reduced the possibility of
a resumption of fighting. Later on, the Assembly decided to
place the UNEF on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice line once
74Israel had withdrawn. This withdrawal was completed by 
8 March.
The fact that UNEF was established at a special session
of the Assembly called by the Uniting for Peace procedure has
led to an assumption that the constitutional authority for
UNEF lies in the Uniting for Peace resolution. But this
resolution had always been opposed by the Soviet Union and her
allies. The Soviet Union has contended that the provisions of
Chapter VII do in effect entail a prohibition on the Assembly
75in respect of the establishment of UN Forces. The United
7 6States based the UNEF's existence on certain specific
74. GA Res. 1125 (X-l), 2 February 1957.
75. I.P.K.O. Documents, ibid., No.17.
76. Ibid., No.19.
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articles of the Charter - Articles 10, 11, 14 and 22 - but
the Soviet Union looking to the same articles has denied that
77they can provide a legal basis for UNEF. It was only
because Egypt consented to UNEF that the Soviet Union
7 8abstained on rather than voted against its creation.
The United Nations Emergency Force went to Egypt with 
the express consent of the Egyptian Government and after the 
other parties concerned had agreed to a cease-fire. The UNEF 
was designed not to fight but rather to allow those involved 
to disengage without further disturbance. In other words,
UNEF was a device which would enable all parties to return to 
the status quo ante with maximum speed and minimum loss of 
face. Later on the UNEF's mandate was broadened to watch over 
the armistice lines between Israel and the U.A.R. The object 
of the UNEF was then preventive. It was to be placed between 
belligerents to ensure that the armistice is observed, or that 
a threatening situation does not develop into actual fighting. 
The element of force was, strictly speaking, minimal; it was 
military only in being composed of soldiers. The creation and 
functioning of UNEF was due to many factors, particularly 
because no interested power could impose a solution alone, and 
all great and small powers preferred an international controlled 
solution to a conflict which could develop dangerously into a 
wider war. It is true that the Soviet view of UNEF has been 
critical. However, its opposition always remained silent and 
never reached the proportions of active obstruction. The
77. Ibid., No.17.
78. Higgins, Rosalyn. 'United Nations Peace-Keeping' 
Documents and Commentary, I, pp.261-62.
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Soviet criticism was of a legal and political character, 
maintaining that only the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, has the power to establish an 
international police force. But for political reasons the 
Soviet Union did not vote against the establishing of the 
UNEF.
The conditions of UNEF laid down by the Secretary-
7 9General in his two reports of 4 and 6 November 1956 were 
the necessary basis of its existence and also set the limits 
to what it might achieve. In summary these principles were:
1. No permanent member of the Security Council or any 
interested Government should contribute contingents 
to the Force.
2. The Force should not be used to affect the military 
or political outcome of the dispute.
3. Its arms should only be used in self-defence, so its 
success in keeping the peace depended mainly on the 
readiness of the parties to maintain the cease-fire.
4. It should not be stationed on a State's territory 
except with that State's consent.
Some of these basic principles proved to be inadequate 
for later UN Peace-keeping operations, particularly in the 
Congo case, as was mentioned earlier in Chapter 2. The 
Secretary-General, in answering a question, said the UNEF 
would have to function at the dividing line between Egyptian 
and Israeli forces wherever that might be...while the Force 
would have to start close to the Canal, it would end up at
79. UN Documents A/3289 and A/3302. The conditions were
later confined in Document A/3943, dated 9 October 1958.
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the Armistice Demarcation Line. He said also that its 
function would be to help maintain quiet during and after the 
withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops and to secure compliance 
with the terms of the resolution of 2 November. While 
emphasising that it was a temporary force, he saw it as 
staying beyond the immediate crisis for a period which would 
be determined by the needs arising out of the present 
conflict.^
As for the financing of UNEF, the Secretary-General 
recommended that a special account outside the regular budget 
be set up for UNEF and that the costs of the force be charged 
by member States on the basis of the scale of assessments to 
be adopted for the 1957 budget. The special account was a 
device for getting funds for the force immediately but it does 
not bar consideration of UNEF costs as a United Nations 
expenditure within the general scope and intent of Article 17 
of the Charter. This proposal touched off a controversy 
between the Soviet Union in particular and the United States 
which culminated in the financial crisis of the United Nations. 
We shall return to this point later, in Chapter 5.
For ten years UNEF was a buffer between two potential
belligerents, in order to prevent a resumption of hostilities.
/
But the events of the second half of 1967 proved that the 
whole concept of peace-keeping operations may have its 
shortcomings. Here we touch upon the question of consent 
which was the subject of much controversy during the Middle 
East crisis. Consent has been an essential part of the entire
80. UN Document A/3302, paras 7 and 8.
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UNEF scheme. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Member
States were singularly forceful on this point. In his second
report to the General Assembly of 6 November 1956 the
Secretary-General stressed his view that 'while the General
Assembly is enabled to establish the Force...it could not
request the Force to be stationed or operate on the territory
81of a given country.' In resolution 998 (ES-1) the Assembly 
called for the placing of the UNEF along both sides of the 
armistice demarcation line. Israel did not accept this 
proposal, and hence never became a 'host' to UNEF. Egypt was 
the 'host' to UNEF and the very fact that UNEF was in that 
country with Egypt's consent led to the establishment of a 
relationship with the UN which was to serve as an example for 
subsequent UN peace-keeping.
Actually, the need to have Egyptian consent to the 
stationing of UNEF troops on territory subject to Egyptian 
sovereignty has never been challenged by the General Assembly. 
Indeed, without consent, the operation, by definition, would 
be enforcement and thus, for the General Assembly at least, 
illegal, if not politically unsound. In an operation based on 
the consent of the parties a major problem is the termination 
of consent. Is there any restriction on the right of a party 
to retract its consent unilaterally and request the withdrawal 
of the United Nations force? A good deal of public outrage 
was directed at Secretary-General U Thant when, in May 1967, 
he agreed promptly to the request of the United Arab Republic 
that UNEF leave the country. It has been alleged that the
81. UN Document A/3302, 2nd and final report of the 
Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency 
international UN Force, 6 November 1956.
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final decision on the withdrawal of UNEF should have been
taken only after consideration by the General Assembly. In
UN Peace-keeping Operations the host State is the final
arbiter of the continued presence of a UN force in its
territory. A peace-keeping operation which requires the
consent of the parties to begin its task logically requires
their consent throughout its duration, which means that the
parties have the right to cancel their consent at any time
unless they agree, either formally or tacitly, to a limitation
of this right. There was no such explicit agreement in the
case of UNEF. The question remains, however, whether there
was an implied limitation on U.A.R.'s right to end the
operation, based on the general agreements between Egypt as
host State and the United Nations on the presence and
functioning of the Force, or based on the nature of the
relationship between the United Nations and Egypt.
The only agreement between the United Nations and Egypt
relating in any way to the withdrawal of UNEF was a reciprocal
pledge of good faith in all matters concerning the presence
8 2and functioning of the Force. The Government of Egypt 
declared that:
When exercising its sovereign rights on any matter 
concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it 
will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of 
General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-1) of 
5 November 1956.
The UN for its part declared:
The activities of UNEF will be guided, in good faith, 
by the task established for the Force, in particular, 
the United Nations understanding this to correspond 
to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms 
its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is 
completed.
82. UN Document A/3575 (the good faith aide memoir of 20 
November 1956) Annex to the report.
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The Secretary-General himself did not offer any interpretation 
of the 'good faith' aide-memoir to the General Assembly or 
make any statement questioning the remarks made by the Foreign 
Minister of Egypt in the General Assembly the following week.
He said, 'We still believe... the General Assembly could not 
request the United Nations Emergency Force to be stationed or 
to operate on the territory of a given country without the 
consent of the Government of that country.' It would appear, 
however, that in an exchange of cables he had sought to obtain 
the express acknowledgement from Egypt that its consent to the 
presence of the Force would not be withdrawn before the Force 
had completed its task. Egypt did not accept this 
interpretation but held to the view that if its consent was no 
longer maintained the Force should be withdrawn. Subsequent 
discussions between Mr Hammarskjöld and President Nasser 
resulted in the above-mentioned 'good faith' aide-memoir.
This understanding could relate only to General Assembly 
Resolution 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956 which defined the 
task of UNEF in very general terms as being to 'secure and 
supervise the cessation of hostilities.' Once UNEF was 
deployed and hostilities ceased, it can be said that the task 
of the Force was completed. Therefore, the good faith pledge 
could not have any relevance to the later function defined for 
UNEF by the General Assembly on 2 February 1957 (Res. 1125(XI)). 
But a personal memorandum of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskhold 
reveals that he understood the 'good faith' agreement as a 
limitation to the right of Egypt to revoke its consent on the 
presence of UNEF on its territory. The memorandum, dated 
5 August 1957, was not an official UN document, and had never 
been made public until it was released during the controversy
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over the withdrawal of UNEF by Ernest Gross, a former United
States representative to the United Nations, who had been a
legal consultant to Dag Hammarskjöld. On its release, the
United Arab Republic dismissed it as having no legal or
political binding force, and Secretary-General U Thant said
that the government of the United Arab Republic knew nothing
about it and was in no way bound by it. Moreover, it is not
clear from the memorandum whether the Egyptian Government
agreed even privately to the interpretation given by Dag 
8 3Hammarskjöld.
But can we say that there is an implied limitation on
U.A.R.'s rights to end the UN operation based on the nature of
the relationship between the United Nations and Egypt? Some
84have thought so. The argument is that the United Arab 
Republic had an obligation not to end UNEF operation without 
the concurrence of the United Nations because it accepted the 
Force without a specific reservation of a right to retract 
consent on its own. This argument is based on a doubtful 
presumption in favour of the United Nations authority as 
opposed to the sovereign authority of a State. Actually the 
purpose of the operation is not to place the parties under the 
authority of the United Nations or to reduce their sovereign 
rights; it is rather based on cooperation and therefore it is 
reasonable to assume that the state retains whatever rights it 
has not specifically modified by agreement. From the above 
discussion we can conclude that any UN peace-keeping operation
83. A/6730/Add.3, Report of the Secretary-General, 22 June 
1967.
84. Tandon, Y. 'UNEF, the Secretary-General and International 
Diplomacy in the Third Arab-Israeli War' in International 
Organisation, Vol. XXII, Number 2, Spring 1968, p.530.
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is based on the principle of consent as to the authorisation, 
the functioning or the withdrawal of the international force. 
Otherwise it would turn itself into a sanctions force, 
appropriate only to Security Council enforcement action 
according to Chapter VII of the Charter.
UNEF made a very important contribution towards achieving
stability along the Armistice Demarcation Line and the
international frontier; this was a great improvement in the
situation. But it did not change the attitude of the parties
because the fundamental problem remained unsolved; therefore,
it seemed that the pacific attitude had little to do with the
presence of the Force. When the tension between Syria and
Israel reached a high level in 1967, Egypt asked for the
immediate withdrawal of UNEF from the frontier. On 6 June
the third Arab-Israeli war started. The Security Council
could do nothing till 22 November 1967 when the Council
unanimously affirmed that a just and lasting peace settlement
must include an Israeli withdrawal from the territories which
she had occupied since June 1967, and the 'termination of all
claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of every State in the area and their
right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries
8 5free from threats or acts of force.' The resolution noted 
also the need for a just settlement of the refugee problem and 
free navigation through international waterways. The 
Secretary-General was asked to send a Special Representative
85. SC Res. 242, 22 November 1967.
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to the Middle East and he appointed Mr Gunnar Jarring,
Sweden's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to the post. The 
Special Representative set up his headquarters in Nicosia, 
but as he could make no progress he proposed that his mission 
should be transferred from the Middle East to the UN 
headquarters in New York. The parties agreed, but there was 
still no progress. In fact both superpowers have an interest 
in keeping the peace in the area, but it was clear that they 
were not going to adopt an active line to solve the problem 
till the outbreak of war again on 6 October 1973.
It was the eight nonaligned Members of the Security 
Council - Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan 
and Yugoslavia - which proposed the dispatch of an Emergency 
Force after two cease-fire resolutions sponsored by the Soviet 
Union and the United States had failed to stop the new war.
The first resolution adopted by the Council on 22 October 1973 
called for the parties to the dispute to cease fire and end all 
military activities within 12 hours. It also called on all 
parties to begin immediately following the cease-fire to apply 
Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 in all its 
parts, which included Israeli withdrawal from territories 
occupied in the June 1967 war, as well as security for all 
within recognised boundaries. Moreover, the Security Council 
decided under Resolution 338 that at the same time a cease-fire 
was carried out talks should begin between the parties 
concerned under proper supervision with the aim of establishing 
a just and permanent peace in the Middle East. The second 
cease-fire resolution, adopted by the Security Council on 23 
October urged withdrawal to the 22 October 1973 positions and 
called for the dispatch of UN Observers. Observers were already
68
functioning on the Syrian-Israeli front and their operation 
was later adjusted to take account of the new military 
situation. The resolution of the non-aligned States, adopted 
by the Council in its Resolution 340 of 25 October 1973, 
called for an augmented observer operation on the Suez Canal 
front and provided for the establishment of a UN Force which 
would exclude participation by the Council's five permanent 
Members.
Advance units drawn from the UN Force in Cyprus were on 
the spot within 24 hours. The Security Council then decided 
under Resolution 341 of 27 October 1973 to set up a 7,000-man 
Force for an initial period of six months, and continue in 
operation thereafter if the Council so decided. Its functions 
are to supervise the observance of the cease-fire and the 
return of forces to 22 October 1973 positions, to use its best 
efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and to co-operate 
in the humanitarian efforts of the Red Cross.
The dispatch of UNEF was followed by several important 
events. On 11 November 1973 an Egyptian-Israeli agreement 
covering a number of major problems was signed by the Military 
Chiefs of Staff of the two countries and by the UNEF Commander 
at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez Road. Worked out with the 
help of US Secretary of State, Dr Kissinger, it was welcomed 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as a very 
important step toward peace. Most of its provisions were 
swiftly put into effect under UN auspices - unhindered non­
military supplies for the town of Suez and Egyptian units on 
the East Bank of the Canal, exchange of war prisoners, and 
evacuation of wounded civilians from Suez, and the replacement 
of Israeli by UN checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez Road.
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Disengagement and separation of forces proved more troublesome, 
but on 18 January 1974 an agreement was concluded, and on the 
24th a detailed plan for carrying it out was signed. It was 
emphasised that this was not a definitive settlement, but a 
first step towards a final, just and durable peace, in 
accordance with the Security Council resolution of 22 October 
1973, and within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference.
In accordance with Resolution 338 of 22 October 1973, the 
first stage of the Middle East Peace Conference was held in 
Geneva late in December 1973, under the sponsorship of the 
Soviet Union and the United States, and presided over by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. It heard Egypt, 
Jordan and Israel outline their hopes for the future. There 
is yet no indication as to when the second stage of the Geneva 
Conference will be convened. The Secretary-General has warned 
that facing all the other aspects of the Middle East question 
that have to be dealt with will be a long, hard task demanding 
courage, statesmanship and patience.
"I have no illusions as to the difficulties, but I
believe that all the parties are determined to succeed. If
that is so, it should be possible to reach at last the goal of
8 6peace with honour and justice in the Middle East."
With disengagement completed, there are three strips 
averaging roughly ten kilometres in width each and running 
North-South on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. The middle 
one is a buffer zone occupied by UNEF. The Egyptian forces in
86. Press Conference, 10 January 1974, SG/SM 1947.
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the western strip and the Israeli in the eastern are subject 
to limitations of armaments, which are checked by UNEF and 
UNTSO Observers. The Secretary-General has emphasised that 
there is good co-operation between all parties trying to solve 
the Middle East problem and that he did not see any rivalry in 
the matter. He observed that the UN was not just watching; 
the Organization was constantly involved in contacts with all 
concerned. Mr Waldheim made this point:
"I can only welcome the fact that for the first time the
two superpowers are ready to engage themselves, as they done
it directly in the efforts to achieve a lasting settlement of
the Middle East question and they also insist on cooperating
8 7fully with the United Nations."
Meanwhile, various consultations and contacts were taking 
place regarding the possibilities for disengagement and 
separation of forces on the Syrian-Israeli front. On 31 May 
1974, Syria and Israel signed in Geneva a military 
disengagement agreement. The guns, which for some three 
months had been firing with escalating intensity in the Golan 
Heights, finally fell silent. General Ensio Siilasvuo of 
Finland who signed for the United Nations as an observer and 
who, four months earlier, had witnessed the signing of the 
Disengagement Agreement between Egypt and Israel said that 
"Although the present agreement is not a peace treaty, no one 
can deny that it represents a milestone in the unceasing 
efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle 
East...I have the strong conviction that this historic 
agreement may well turn out to be that giant and courageous
87. Ibid.
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step that brought us to the threshold of a new era of trust,
justice and peace in the Middle East."^
Within a few hours of the signing in Geneva, the UN
Security Council met in New York to set up a new peace-keeping
operation - UNDOF - the United Nations Disengagement Observer
89Force between Syria and Israel.
As authorised for an initial six-month period, the new 
force was drawn primarily from UNEF contingents serving in the 
buffer zone between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai 
Desert. Drawing also observers from the long-standing UN 
Truce Supervision Organization in the area, UNDOF comprises 
a total of some 1,200 men.
The Council acted on the basis of a resolution jointly 
sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. It was 
introduced by US Ambassador John Scali, who said that the new 
accord, together with the earlier Disengagement Agreement 
between Egypt and Israel, would open the way to progress at 
the Geneva Peace Conference towards an enduring Mid-east 
settlement. He said:
"We are pleased that the United States, through the 
efforts of Secretary Kissinger, was privileged to 
help bring about this agreement. We express our 
appreciation also for the cooperation of the Soviet 
Union as reflected in the three conversations which 
the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister 
have held in recent weeks."90
The Council, said Mr Scali, was being asked to take the next 
critical step in the hoped-for quickening movement towards a 
permanent peace.
88. Palais de Nations, Geneva, 31 May 1974.
89. Security Council, 1774th meeting, 31 May 1974.
90. Ibid.
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For the Soviet Union, Ambassador Yakov Malik told the 
Security Council:
"The Soviet Union, as a participant in the numerous 
contacts in the preparations for the Agreement on the 
Disengagement of Syrian and Israeli troops, favourably 
assesses the agreement that has been achieved...At the 
same time, the Soviet Union considers it necessary to 
stress that this troop Disengagement Agreement is only 
a step towards the fulfilment of the major task, which 
is the total liberation of the Arab territories from 
Israeli occupation. This task must be performed if 
all interested parties genuinely wish to achieve a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East. The Geneva Peace 
Conference on the Middle East accordingly is faced with 
a serious task: that of finding on this basis a
solution to the Middle East problem in the interests 
of peace, security and the protection of the legitimate 
interests of all States and peoples of that region, 
including the Arab people of Palestine. The Soviet 
Union will continue to do everything in its power and 
everything possible along these lines, in its role as 
a participant in the Geneva Conference. "91
The Resolution setting up the new Disengagement Observer
Force was approved by 13 votes in favour to none against.
China, which does not favour the dispatch of UN Peace-keeping
Forces in general, disassociated herself from the decision.
So did Iraq. Many speakers hailed the Council action as
falling squarely within its central role of preventing war
and maintaining international peace and security, and as
showing that the UN is inextricably linked to the task of
92creating peace in the Middle East.
The Council agreed to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim's 
plan to set up UNDOF on the basis of the same principles 
approved for UNEF, and to draw on the latter's Peruvian and 
Austrian contingents and Canadian and Polish logistical 
elements along with UNTSO observers. General Gonzalo Briceno, 
Peruvian Commander of UNEF's northern brigade, was named
91. Ibid. (Russian, then translation).
92. Ibid.
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interim commander of the new force in the Golan Heights, and
General Siilasvuo, who commands UNEF, was later named to
co-ordinate all the Mideast operations.
Like the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement before it, the new
Syrian-Israeli Military Disengagement Accord provided for a
United Nations buffer zone, with a thinning out of forces and
armaments on either side. There were also specific timetables
for carrying out its provisions. Accordingly, within 24 hours
of the signing in Geneva, on 1 June, all Syrian and Israeli
wounded prisoners of war were repatriated, and work was begun
on a detailed plan for carrying out the separation and
disengagement of forces. On 5 June 1974, at the signing of
another agreement in Geneva, General Siilasvuo said:
"With the completion of our work, the process of 
disengagement and separation of forces will begin 
tomorrow. I want to congratulate particularly the 
Israeli and Syrian representatives for their 
cooperation and understanding throughout the talks 
held here in Geneva. I am sure I discern a sign, 
however feeble, of a desirable change of attitude."
He also welcomed the participation of representatives of the
Soviet Union and the United States in the military working
group as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. The two powers,
he added, had thus again underlined their determination to
94cooperate in building a new structure of peace in the area.
On 6 June, UNDOF began operations as disengagement got 
under way, and all remaining Syrian and Israeli prisoners of 
war were repatriated. Meanwhile, the Secretary-General of the 
UN also had occasion to observe a new atmosphere in the area. 
Following talks with President Nixon and Secretary of State
93. Palais de Nations, Geneva, 5 June 1974.
94. Ibid.
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Kissinger in Washington, the Secretary-General had an
opportunity to discuss the situation with government leaders
in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan and Egypt. He was able to
meet with all the senior UN military personnel and to visit
all the peace-keeping operations, including UNDOF. As for his
personal impression of the UN soldiers of peace who come from
different parts of the world, he said:
"I am happy to say that there is an excellent 
cooperation between the different nationalities.
There is comradeship and they help each other... 
and they are also full of idealism. They see a 
real task, a task for peace...In other words, they 
are really representing the spirit of the United 
Nations, and I think this is a very important 
contribution to the efforts in the political field 
to find a solution of the Middle East problem."^
In summing up his trip to the Middle East, Mr Waldheim
commented:
"Well, I think that it was a very useful experience 
and a necessary trip...I am convinced that we have 
reached a turning point in the Middle East with the 
Disengagement Agreements. I noticed a change in 
the political climate. There is more confidence in 
a settlement of the outstanding questions."96
While expressing enthusiasm about the Disengagement
Agreement, the Secretary-General warned that this did not mean
that a just and durable peace was at hand. He emphasised that
long and active efforts would be needed to come to solve the
problems. The Secretary-General was also asked about the
resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference, and said in reply:
"Well, there are different opinions. There are some 
Governments which feel that the Conference should be 
convened as soon as possible in order to use the 
momentum. But there are other Governments which 
prefer a later beginning so that the parties and the 
Governments can absorb what has been achieved during
95. Press Conference, Geneva Airport, L-529, 6 June 1974.
96. Ibid.
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the last weeks and months, to prepare carefully the 
Conference, and then only to resume the second phase 
of the Geneva Conference. So, we have to see how 
things develop now within the next few weeks, and 
only then it will be possible to decide when the 
Geneva Conference can be reconvened.
The disengagement between forces was merely a first step
towards a settlement of the Middle East problem, and the
continued functioning of the Emergency Forces was fundamental,
not only to the maintenance of quiet on the fronts, but also
in order to help, if requested, in efforts to reach a just and
durable peace in the area. The Security Council a d(.opte4its
resolution 246 of 8 April 1974 which called for the renewal of
the United Nations Emergency Mandate for another six months,
and renewed it for a further six months under resolution 362
of 23 October 1974. But it noted that the general situation
in the Middle East would continue basically unstable so long
as problems which are at the root of the dispute remained
unsolved. Therefore efforts were made during February and
March 1975 to reach another disengagement agreement with the
aim of paving the way for the Geneva Conference, where the
main issues could be discussed in order to set up a just and
permanent peace in the Middle East. Nevertheless, these efforts
failed. In spite of this and for the purpose of defusing the
explosive situation, President Sadat of Egypt decided to re-open
the Suez Canal to international navigation. He ordered the
implementation of an intensive plan for the reconstruction of
the Canal cities and some 600,000 citizens have returned to
9 8their homes to date. In addition, the Egyptian Government
97. Ibid.
98. From the letter which Deputy Premier and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations on 14 July 1975.
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decided to renew the mandate of the UNEF for an additional
three months, so as not to negate the efforts of the mission
as a preliminary step towards the implementation of the
Security Council resolutions. The Egyptian Government
9 9informed the Secretary-General that it should be pointed out 
that until further steps towards peace are taken, extension of 
the Mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force by the 
Security Council would be at variance with the Council's 
objective in establishing the force, in that it would tend to 
turn the quiet into stagnation and consequently perpetuate 
the Israeli occupation. In his letter to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations the Egyptian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs said "While Egypt does not agree to the extension of 
the UNEF Mandate, it does not object to the UN Security 
Council taking the actions it deems fit within its powers in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter."1^0 The Egyptian 
Government pointed out in the above-mentioned letter that 
until further steps towards peace have been taken, Egypt cannot 
extend the mandate of the UNEF.
The Security Council voted on 24 July 1975 to extend for 
three months the mandate of the United Nations emergency force 
in Sinai. The extension was approved by 13 of the 15 Council 
members after China and Iraq dissociated themselves from the 
resolution. The Council vote was taken only six hours before 
the old mandate was due to run out, after snags arose over the 
wording of the resolution. The issue was resolved when the 
Italian Ambassador Mr Eugenio Plaja, the Council President, 
agreed to make an opening statement expressing his appreciation
99. Ibid. 
100. Ibid.
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to the Government of Egypt for its positive response to the 
appeal sent by him to President Sadat on 21 July 1975.
The Council's resolution expressed concern at the continued 
state of tension in the area and the lack of progress towards 
achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
3. The UN in West Irian.
The dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over 
West Irian involved the UN in another unprecedented role.
The western half of the island of New Guinea was governed as 
part of the Netherlands East Indies prior to the establishment 
of an independent Indonesia. However, the political status of 
West New Guinea was not settled by agreements leading to the 
independence of Indonesia. The Netherlands claimed that its 
sovereignty over the territory was unaffected by the Charter 
of Transfer of Sovereignty, while Indonesia maintained that 
West New Guinea became an integral part of its territory on 
the date of Indonesia's independence. The Netherlands 
continued to administer the territory. The dispute was 
brought before the General Assembly from 1954 to 1961 without 
any significant change in the position of either party. During 
December 1961 and January 1962 a number of serious clashes 
took place between Dutch and Indonesian troops. The United 
Nations Secretary-General arranged for Dutch and Indonesian 
delegations to negotiate in the presence of a moderator, 
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker of the United States. An 
agreement for the transfer of administration from the 
Netherlands was signed on 15 August 1962. On 21 September
101. Canberra Times, The Australian, 26 July 1975.
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1962 the General Assembly passed a resolution approving the
Agreement concluded between Indonesia and the Netherlands
acknowledging the role conferred upon the Secretary-General in 
102the Agreement. The Agreement which the Assembly approved
included a provision that the Secretary-General should provide
such security forces as the UN Administration should deem
necessary. In fact, the Agreement provided for the United
Nations to assume a number of functions which involved peace
observation and fact-finding, during the period before the
transfer of administrative authority to Indonesia, which turned
out to be 1 May 1965. General Rikkye, senior military adviser
to the Secretary-General, arrived in West Irian on 17 August
1962 before the General Assembly had considered the Agreement
and consented to assume the functions assigned to it.
The Agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia
103provided for two phases of United Nations operations.
During the first period, after the cessation of hostilities on 
18 August 1962, the Secretary-General agreed to undertake the 
following functions:
1. to observe the implementation of the cease-fire by both 
parties and their agreement not to reinforce their military 
forces.
2. to take necessary steps for the prevention of any acts 
endangering the security of the forces of both parties.
3. to receive reports of any incidents and take the necessary 
measures to resolve the situation in consultations with 
both parties.
102. GA Res. 1752 (XVII).
103. UN General Assembly, A/5170 (mimeo), 20 August 1962,
Annex A, pp.1-9.
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4. to make advance arrangements to permit the rapid
installation of a UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)
on General Assembly approval of the agreement between the
104Netherlands and Indonesia.
During the second period after the General Assembly's 
approval of the agreement, the functions conferred on the 
Secretary-General were as follows:
1. Administration of the territory would be transferred from
the Netherlands to a UN Temporary Executive Authority
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General. A UN
administrator acceptable to Indonesia and the Netherlands
would be appointed by the Secretary-General and would have
full authority under the direction of the Secretary-
General to administer the territory for the period of the
105UNTEA administration.
2. The Secretary-General would supply UNTEA with such 
security forces as the administrator deemed necessary. 
Moreover, UNTEA had responsibilities in connection with 
advancing the education of the inhabitants, responsibilities 
that continued even after the transfer of administrative 
responsibility to Indonesia. The agreement described in 
detail the participation of the Secretary-General in the 
act of self-determination.
During the period from the cessation of hostilities 
until the establishment of UNTEA on 1 October 1962, the 
functions assigned to the Secretary-General were performed 
by the military adviser to the Secretary-General, Brigadier
104. Ibid., Annex B, p.ll.
105. Ibid., Annex A, p.2.
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General Rikhye, and twenty-one military observers provided
by six member states - Brazil, Ceylon, India, Ireland,
Nigeria and Sweden. Their duties were to assist the Dutch
and Indonesian troops in preparing for the take-over of
authority of UNTEA in October. On 21 September 1962, the
United Nations observer team reported that it had
completed its task. In accordance with the General
Assembly recommendation, the Secretary-General's
representative arrived in the territory and prepared a
106detailed plan for the transfer of authority to UNTEA.
UN Administrator Dr D.J. Abdoh was appointed on 
24 October 1962; he re-organised the civilian administrator 
by replacing 18 top Dutch officials with United Nations- 
appointed personnel.
Thus the objectives of UN activities in connection 
with the transfer of West Irian from the Netherlands to 
Indonesia went far beyond peace observation and even 
peace-keeping. For example, UNTEA had for a time full 
administrative responsibility for the territory, the duty 
of supervising the replacement of Dutch officials, and 
duties in connection with providing economic assistance.
The Agreement on West Irian gave to the Secretary-General 
an authority of considerable scope. UNTEA was to be 
established by and under his jurisdiction and not the 
Security Council's, and he was also to provide UN security 
forces. All permanent members of the Security Council 
voted in favour of the resolution. The affirmative vote
106. UN General Assembly, Official Records, Eighteenth 
Session, Supplement No.l (A/5501), p.36.
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of the Soviet Union runs to some extent against their 
strongly argued position on the right limits to the 
authority of both the Secretary-General and the General 
Assembly, because Russia was supporting the Indonesian 
cause in the crisis and the agreement was acceptable to 
Indonesia. The UNTEA military forces consisted of 
approximately 1,500 UN troops, 350 Papuan troops - 
originally officered by Dutch but later by Indonesians - 
and almost 1,500 Indonesian troops, all under the command 
of UNTEA. The UN troops, apart from some Canadian and US 
pilots, were all Pakistanis. This was the first instance 
of a UN operation with personnel from only one country.
The full costs of the operations were shared by the Dutch 
and the Indonesians, thus avoiding some of the problems 
that have confronted the United Nations in other cases.
This point will be discussed later on. The United Nations 
contingent was completely withdrawn on 1 May 1963, when 
the Indonesian Government assumed authority.
The UN operation in West Irian was successful in 
implementing the agreement for cessation of hostilities, and 
achieved the transfer of authority from the Dutch to the 
Indonesians with a minimum of violence. The time element was 
most significant. The cease-fire was signed on 12 August 1962, 
the first observers arrived on 17 August, and the preliminary 
task was completed by the first of October. The General 
Assembly authorised the formation of UNTEA on 21 September. 
UNTEA and its military force arrived on 1 October and completed 
its main tasks by 1 May 1963. The UN Secretariat proved its 
ability to take on these functions in such a short time.
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PART TWO
THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
Chapter 4
The Strategy and Tactics of the Secretary-General
1. The Secretary-General and the Employment of the 
Secretariat.
The Secretary-General is appointed by the General
107Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
The role of these bodies is limited to procedures of the 
selection, and once he is elected he is protected against the 
pressure of all Members during his term of office. The 
recommendation for appointment from the Security Council is 
not regarded as a procedural matter, so it is subject to the 
veto. The existence of the veto has meant that, in practice, 
the person recommended to the Assembly must have been approved 
by the major powers.
The Charter emphasises the personal responsibility of
the Secretary-General. 'The staff shall be appointed by the
108Secretary-General.' It is he who is responsible for
appointment of all members of the Secretariat and for the 
manner in which they carry out their tasks. It is evident 
from Article 101 that a 'paramount consideration in the 
employment of the staff in the determination of the conditions 
of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest 
standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due
107. Article 97 of the Charter of the UN.
108. Article 101, para 1.
83
regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff
on as wide a geographical basis as possible'. This Article
would suggest a special qualification in the employment of
the Secretariat staff, but the principle of geographical
distribution is also taken into account. The Secretary-
General did not interpret the principle as meaning that the
citizens of a particular country should have a specified
number of posts, nor that they should receive a particular
percentage of the total salaries. Rather, he clarified: "in
the first place, the administration should be satisfied that
the Secretariat is enriched by the experience and culture
which each member nation can furnish and that each Member
nation should, in its turn, be satisfied that its own culture
109and philosophy make a full contribution to the Secretariat." 
Article 101 could be interpreted as intended to accord priority 
to considerations of efficiency and competence over those of 
geographical representation.
Article 100 of the Charter provides that the Secretary- 
General and his staff "...shall not seek or receive 
instructions from any government or from any other authority 
external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any 
action which might reflect on their position as international 
officials responsible only to the Organization." Meanwhile 
the Charter legally assures the Secretary-General and his 
staff protection against certain acts. "Each Member of the 
United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively 
international character of the responsibilities of the 
Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence
109. General Assembly, Official Records, Third Session, 
Plenary, Annexes, A/652, p.157.
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them in the discharge of their responsibilities."^^ Article
105 provides that the Organization shall enjoy in the
territory of each member such privileges and immunities as
are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes. Also,
officials of the Organization "shall similarly enjoy such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their functions in connection with the
O r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e s e  privileges and immunities have been
defined in international agreements approved by the General
Assembly. The most important are the Convention on Privileges
112and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946,
and the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and
113the United Nations of 31 October 1947. Therefore, there
are two essential principles of the permanent Secretariat. 
Firstly, its international composition, a principle finding 
legal expression in Article 101 of the UN Charter. The second 
principle concerns its international responsibilities, and is 
based in Articles 100 and 105 of the Charter. In his last 
speech, which was made to the Secretariat staff on the 
occasion of Staff Day in the General Assembly Hall, Dag 
Hammarskjöld clarified his reasoning when he said: "At stake
is a basic question of principle: Is the Secretariat to
develop as an international Secretariat, with full independence 
contemplated in Article 100 of the Charter, or is it to be 
looked upon as an intergovernmental - not international - 
secretariat providing merely the necessary administrative
110. Article 100, para 2.
111. Article 105, para 2.
112. UN Doc. A/43, Annex 1, pp.687-93.
113. General Assembly Resolution 169(11).
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services for a conference machinery? This is a basic question 
and the answer to it affects not only the working of the 
Secretariat but the whole future of international relations.
If the Secretariat is regarded as truly international, and its 
individual members as owing no allegiance to any national 
government, then the Secretariat may develop as an instrument 
for the preservation of peace and security of increasing 
significance and responsibilities. If a contrary view were to 
be taken the Secretariat itself would not be available to 
member governments as an instrument, additional to the normal 
diplomatic methods, for active and growing service in the 
common interest."
The Secretariat comprises the Secretary-General together
with the staff appointed by him. The Secretary-General is
designated as the chief administrative officer not of the
Secretariat but of the Organization as a whole (Article 97).
It is the office of the Secretary-General, rather than the
Secretariat, which has been referred to in Article 7 of the 
115Charter as the sixth principal organ of the United Nations,
since his authority extends over the Secretariat as a whole.
The Secretary-General "is the only elected officer in
116principle representing all members." As Secretary-General,
Dag Hammarskjöld paid much attention to having a unified
114. 8 September 1961 - Foote (ed.), Servant of Peace, p.376.
115. Article 7, para 1. 'There are established as the 
principal organs of the United Nations, a General 
Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social 
Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court 
of Justice, and a Secretariat.'
116. From Dag Hammarskjöld address at the special Convocation 
and dedicatory celebration marking the completion and 
occupancy of the new Law Building of the University of 
Chicago, Law School, Chicago, 1 May 1960, Foote (ed.), 
ibid., p.335.
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executive in the office of the Secretary-General for the
constitutional development and growing influence of the United
Nations. He noted that a weak or non-existent executive would
mean that the United Nations would no longer be able to serve
as an effective instrument for active protection of the
interests of those many Members who need such protection.
This policy was noted clearly when Nikita Khrushchev, then
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union,
proposed to "set up, in the place of a Secretary-General who
is at present the interpreter and executor of the decisions of
the General Assembly and the Security Council, a collective
executive organ of the United Nations consisting of three
persons each of whom would represent a certain group of States.
That would provide a definite guarantee that the work of the
United Nations executive organ would not be carried on to the
117detriment of any one of these group of States..." The
Soviet Union argued that "any Secretary-General could be the 
impartial representative of three different groups of 
States...." The Secretary-General confirmed that there was 
nothing in the Charter which puts responsibility of the kind 
of the Congo Operation on the shoulders of the Secretary- 
General or makes him the independent master of such an 
operation. It was the Security Council which, without any
118dissenting vote, gave this mandate to the Secretary-General.
117. General Assembly, Official Records, 15th year, Plenary 
meeting 869 (23 September 1960), para 272-85 and meeting 
871 (26 September 1960), 882 (3 October 1960) and 883
(3 October 1960) .
118. Ibid.
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2. Administrative and Political Functions for the Secretary- 
General .
In Article 97 of the United Nations Charter the 
Secretary-General is characterised as the 'chief administrative 
officer of the Organization.1 In that capacity his role can 
be described as limited to administrative problems outside the 
sphere of political conflicts. But that is not all. Article 
98 provides that the Secretary-General 'shall perform such 
other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs.'
This entitles the General Assembly and the Security Council to 
entast the Secretary- General with politicalresfOonsibihUs.Tfie 
Charter provides the Secretary-General with explicit political 
responsibilities. This is made more explicit in Article 99 
than in any other. 'The Secretary-General may bring to the 
attention of the Security Council any matter which in his 
opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace 
and security....' This Article carries with it an implied
inquiries and informal diplomatic activities in order to form
his Oxford University speech Hammarskjöld said: "It was
Article 99 more than any other which was considered by the 
drafters of the Charter to have transformed the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations from a purely administrative
The administrative problems of the Secretariat (the financial 
structure, terms of employment and similar questions) had been 
successfully dealt with by the end of the first Secretary-
such matters, and conducting
his opinion. the Secretary-General is an officiale*truf tec/
Utk with, political role as well as administrative functions. In
official to one with an explicit political responsibility." 119
119. Foote (ed.), ibid., p.335.
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General's tenure of office. As for the political problems,
these were not of great importance. Through the whole period
of Tlygve Lie's office, the Security Council and the General
Assembly were very much under the influence of the Western
Powers. The Latin American countries at that time constituted
120the largest interest group in the UN, which made it easy 
for the Western Powers to pass any resolution. The General 
Assembly session of 1955 was a turning point in the history of 
the United Nations, and from then on the influence of the 
Western Powers has constantly decreased. In that session, the 
United Nations admitted 16 new members, mostly from Africa,
121and thereby started the massive expansion of its membership, 
which made it difficult for the Western Powers to dominate 
decisions on situations threatening international peace and 
security. This significant change in the composition and 
functioning of the Organization enabled Dag Hammarskjöld to 
promote the role of the Secretariat through the methods of 
reconciliation on the basis of the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations. His success with the 
conciliation technique in the Suez crisis of 1956 led to 
direct involvement of the UN in a number of major political 
affairs.
The Security Council was frequently paralysed by the veto 
because of clashes of interest within the orbit of Cold War 
conflicts, and as membership increased it also became difficult 
to obtain a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly.
120. They were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela.
121. There are 51 original members.
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Therefore, the effectiveness of the United Nations has become 
increasingly dependent on the Secretary-General. The vast 
majority of member Governments, many of them from the third 
world, were willing to vest responsibility in him because of 
their wish not to be aligned with one or the other power bloc. 
Therefore, we could say that there was a desire from all 
Members, including the major powers, that the Secretary- 
General should be supplied withaspecific political 
Consequently, there are no limits to the duties which the 
Organization may assign to the Secretary-General in political
. Sometimes it will be departing from the basic concept
of the Charter if he is not permitted to take a stand on 
political issues in response to requests of the General
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate the attitude of the organs in 
providing the Secretary-General with tasks that have obliged 
him to practise his duties in the field, on his own initiative 
but within the framework of international law and resolutions
a wide authority was delegated to the Secretary-General in 
matters of peace and security.
3. Chahqinj Roles.
The efforts of successive Secretaries-General had 
developed over the years on the basis of the Charter. The 
role of each Secretary-General was different according to 
circumstances. The years following World War II were marked 
by high tension. The Cold War made it difficult for the 
Secretary-General to intervene effectively in any controversy
Assembly or the Security Council. 122 Several examples in
already taken. 123 In some cases, such as the Congo operations
122. Articles 98 and 99 of the Charter.
123. Chapter 2 and 3, and see pp.107-110.
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involving the interests of the major Powers. Yet Trygve Lie,
the first Secretary-General, gained support from the major
Powers for his assertion of the Secretary-General's right to
make any enquiries or investigations he thought necessary to
determine whether or not he should bring any aspect of a matter
to the attention of the Security Council under the provision 
124of the Charter. At the start of his administration, Lie
was quite cautious. He stated, "Your Secretary-General is not
called upon to formulate the policy of the United Nations...
the lines of that policy are laid down in the Charter and
determined by decisions of the different relevant organs of
the United Nations. The task of the Secretariat will be to
assist all those organs of the United Nations in preparing and
carrying out all decisions taken by them in order to make the
125policy program of the Charter a living reality." Lie's
thinking underwent a marked change during the Korean War, in
regard to global action in the face of a great power. He
found it possible to write, in the Introduction to Sixth
Annual Report in September 1951, that "the founding of the
United Nations was motivated by a far more fundamental and
lasting concept concerning the world than a passing war-time
126alliance of Great Powers."
Despite Lie's early efforts, however, the field remained 
largely unexplored, and it fell to Dag Hammarskjöld to develop
124. Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, 
70th meeting, p.404.
125. General Assembly Official Records, First Session, Part 1 
Plenary, 22nd meeting, 2 February 1946.
126. G.A.O.R. Sixth Session, Supp. No.lA, UN Doc. A/1844/Add. 
1, 20 September 1951.
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more fully the Secretary-General's role. In fact Hammarskjöld 
not only maintained the powers of the Office as initially 
constructed by Lie, but expanded its role far beyond the 
limits dreamed possible by the Organization's founding 
drafters. Hammarskjöld was the first Secretary-General to 
illustrate the capacity of the world organization for 
independent behaviour. He was well aware of the limits of 
his independent activities and sought to strengthen his 
position by seeking informal approval from members of the 
Security Council. But he passionately defended his right to 
exercise "good offices" without a formal decision by a United 
Nations organ. He firmly held that such a right was within 
the competence of the Secretary-General and in all respects in 
strict accordance with the Charter, provided it was exercised 
in order to assist in achieving the purposes of the Charter.
At a press conference in May 1953 Hammarskjöld said: "I
think the right of initiative in a certain sense, informally
of the Secretary-General goes far beyond what is described in
the Charter provided that he observes the proper forms,
chooses his approaches with tact and avoids acting in such a
way as to say, counteract his own purpose this is to say, by
his own initiative further the development but at the same
127time not introducing unnecessary complications." Following
his election to a second term as Secretary-General in 
September 1957 he said: "I do not believe that the Secretary- 
General should be asked to act, by the Member States, if no 
guidance for his action is to be found either in the Charter
127. UN: Office of Public Information, Press Service, Note
No.657, 12 May 1953, p.15.
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or in the decisions of the main organs of the United Nations,
within the limits thus set. However, I believe it to be his
duty to use his office, and indeed, the machinery of the
Organization, to its utmost capacity and to the full extent
permitted at each stage by practical circumstances. On the
other hand I believe that it is in keeping with the philosophy
of the Charter that the Secretary-General should be expected
to act also without such guidance, sllouU appear to him
necessary in order to help in filling any vacuum that may
appear in the systems which the Charter and traditional
diplomacy provide for the safeguarding of peace and 
12 8security." In fact, this "vacuum policy" was regarded by
the Secretary-General as an appropriate legal interpretation
of the Secretary-General's independent powers under the
Charter. His general thinking was based on a very liberal
legal interpretation of the Charter; he considered an action
legal and appropriate when it did not violate any specific
provisions of the Charter and when it was in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the Organization. He noted
also that new working methods could be created to realise
129the goals of the international cooperation.
128. Foote (ed.), ibid. , p; ICO,'.
129. Foote (ed.), ibid., p.223. On this question he stated 
in his 1959 Introduction; 'The Charter as an 
international treaty establishes certain goals for 
international co-operation and creates certain organs 
which the Member States may use in their co-operation 
towards these goals. The statement of objectives in 
the Charter is binding and so are the rules concerning 
the various organs and their competence, but it is not 
necessary to regard the working methods as indicated in 
the Charter as limitative in purpose. Thus, they may 
be supplemented by others under the pressure of 
circumstances and in the light of experience if these 
additional procedures are not in conflict with what is 
prescribed.'
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U Thant stated that the UN Secretary-General had a
political role to play if he was to be of real assistance to
Member States in a dynamic and imaginative search for peace
and for the realization of the purposes and principles of the 
130Organization. Stable and agreed practices were developed
by U Thant on the basis of Hammarskjöld's actions although
U Thant did not merely continue what his predecessors had
begun. In his own words: "The efforts and experiences,
achievements and failures of successive Secretaries-General
are the raw materials out of which the Office had developed
over the years on the basis of the very general description
which is given in the Charter. While the fundamental
objectives of the Charter remain, circumstances change, new
opportunities for development present themselves - and
sometimes new obstacles appear. Things that were possible
for one Secretary-General are no longer possible for his
successor, and vice versa. There are times when action,
dynamism and innovation are in demand, and other times when
Governments shun them like the plague. The Office is, of
necessity developed through trial and error and in response
to the demands and challenges of the passing years. Each
Secretary-General must build as best he can on the Office as
he inherited it. If he cannot hope to repeat all the
r
successes of his predecessors, neither should he feaX to try
131again where they failed."
130. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth 
Sessions, Supp. No.lA, para 137.
131. U Thant. The Role of the Secretary-General, UN Monthly 
Chronicle, Vol.VIII, No.9, October 1971, p.179.
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4. The Extent of the Secretary-General's Responsibility.
The significance of the principle stated in Article 98
of the Charter is that the Secretary-General can perform any
functions entrusted to him by the Security Council or the
General Assembly. The Charter mentioned many ways in which
the Secretary-General could approach the conflicts and
represent his ideas. Moreover, experiences of successive
132Secretaries-General developed other forms of action.
A. The Annual Report;
133The Secretary-General was required to make an annual 
report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization. 
In the Introduction to his Annual Report the Secretary-General 
has consistently discussed important general issues affecting 
the functioning and status of the Organization. Dag 
Hammarskjöld and his successors have used the obligations 
established by Article 98 to submit, in the annual reports, a 
statement of their views on major policy problems. The report 
gives the Secretary-General an opportunity available to no one 
else to explain his stand in the controversial issues. He is 
obliged to keep all Members well informed about the problems 
which he is facing, and through his reports he can discuss his 
policy decisions and obtain political direction from the 
Members.
B. The Advisory Committees:
For practical reasons the Advisory Committees facilitate 
an institutionalised method of consultation. They are
132. Many actions are set forth in the previous chapters 2 
and 3.
133. Article 98.
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comprised of the representatives of delegations under the
chairmanship of the Secretary-General who seeks to formulate
the judgements to be derived from the discussion. The
establishment of the Advisory Committee on UNEF and the later
Advisory Committee on the Congo constituted a defined response
to the need for a constitutional means to assist the Secretary-
General in reducing the elements of purely personal judgement
in political action. The Secretary-General obtained guidance
for his management of peace-keeping forces by consulting the
special advisory committees which were created to deal with
problems which were not already dealt with by the Organs.
Hammarskjöld wrote in the UNEF Summary Report that, "Meetings
of the Advisory Committee have been held whenever matters have
arisen requiring discussion or whenever the Secretary-General
has sought advice, or, at times, only to keep the Committee
informed on current developments. The Advisory Committee has
been consulted particularly on those questions which the
Assembly had indicated should be the subject of consultation
between it and the Secretary-General, such as the Regulations
for the Force, the policy of the Force, as regards self-defence,
134and the issues of medals." The Secretary-General did not
suggest such a committee when UNOGIL was created in June 1958, 
but after the American landing in Lebanon, he announced that 
he had set one up. Again, he did not establish an advisory 
committee for ONUC in the initial stages of the Congo crisis,
135but on 21 August 1960 a Congo Advisory Committee was created.
134. UN Doc. A/3 943, 9 October 1958.
135. Security Council, Official Records, 887th meeting, 
21 August 1960.
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C. To carry out the policies as adopted by the organs: 
Usually the mandates outline to the Secretary-General the 
limits of his role in specific terms. The serious problems 
arise precisely because sometimes it is not possible for the 
authorising organs to define the controversial issue which 
might face the Secretary-General, and consequently it has to 
be left to him to solve it in the light of resolutions already 
taken. The Secretary-General is under the obligation to carry 
out the policies adopted by the authorising organs. In 
principle the competent organ is the judge. It may always 
instruct him, but when it does not he must carry out his tasks 
with full regard to his exclusively international obligation 
under the Charter. He may also seek guidance in statements 
relevant for the interpretation of the resolution. The 
Secretary-General is expected to continue to apply the 
mandates which he has been given previously until a new 
mandate is granted. In his speech at Oxford University on 
30 May 1961 Hammarskjöld said, "...the responsibilities of 
the Secretary-General under the Charter cannot be laid aside 
merely because the execution of decisions by him is likely to 
be politically controversial. The Secretary-General remains 
under the obligation to carry out the policies as adopted by 
the organs; the essential requirement is that he does this on 
the basis of his exclusively international responsibility and 
not in the interest of any particular State or groups of
I O £States." The Secretary-General can refer the issue to the
relevant organ to resolve the problem, but the clash of
136. Foote (ed.), Servant of Peace, p.346.
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interests inside the Security Council or General Assembly may 
prevent any particular solution and consequently the problem 
has to be left to the Secretary-General to solve. It may be 
said that to be on the safe side the Secretary-General should 
not implement a resolution until the organs have reconsidered 
the issue. But this excuse will not discharge the Secretary- 
General from the responsibilities placed upon him by the 
Charter, particularly in a matter considered to affect 
international peace and security. The Secretary-General 
remains under the obligation to implement the resolutions as 
adopted by the organs; and he does this on the basis of his 
international responsibility, guided by the principles and 
purposes of the Charter.
The conclusions of the Secretary-General should to the
utmost degree be of constitutional character. For this purpose
he needs support for his activities within the political organs
of the United Nations. The Secretary-General should obtain
the guidance of the Members through all available channels for
his direction of peace-keeping forces, especially through
resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council
and consultations with delegates of Member states, and from
137special advisory committees.
137. Hammarskjöld noted that 'Experience has thus indicated 
that the international civil servant may take steps to 
reduce the sphere within which he has to take stands on 
politically controversial issues. ...he will seek 
guidance in the decisions of the main organs, in statements 
relevant for the interpretation of those decisions, in 
the Charter and in generally recognised principles of 
law, remembering that by his action he may set important 
precedents. Further, he will submit as complete 
reporting to the main organs as circumstances permit, 
seeking their guidance whenever such guidance seems to 
be possible to obtain.' Foote (ed.), ibid., p.347.
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D. Dealing with conflicts between the Blocs;
Will the major powers be prepared to accept international
conciliation processes directed by the United Nations
Secretary-General when their own interests, especially their
security interests, are regarded by them as directly involved?
Dag Hammarskjöld considered during his first years as
Secretary-General (1953-1955) that peaceful settlement of
conflicts between the blocs was the most important task of
the United Nations. The only major involvements which the
United Nations and Hammarskjöld handled in a dispute over
interests within the blocs was the dispute between the United
States and Communist China in 1954 and 1955 over China's
imprisonment of some American fliers captured during the
Korean War. The United States submitted the dispute to the
138United Nations General Assembly on 5 December 1954. The
General Assembly held five meetings on it, and on 10 December
passed a resolution, declaring that the imprisonment of the
fliers violated the Korean Armistice Agreement, and condemning
their trial and imprisonment by China. It also requested that
the Secretary-General "...make continuing and unremitting
139efforts..." to seek their release. After long negotiations
between the Prime Minister of the State Council and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese People's Republic, Chou 
En-lai, and the Secretary-General the fliers were released on 
1 August 1955. The Secretary-General conducted his discussions 
by virtue of the authority vested in him by the Assembly's 
resolution. The General Assembly initiated a completely new
138. UN Doc. A/2 830, 5 December 1954.
139. GA Res. 906(IX), 10 December 1954.
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means of peaceful settlement when it asked the Secretary-
General to do whatever he could to have the fliers freed.
Trygve Lie during his term of office had tried on his own
initiative to solve or influence the resolution of some
disputes such as the presence of Soviet troops in Iran in
1946, the dispute over Communist China's admission to the 
140United Nations but he had never been asked by the 
representative organs to perform these tasks. This role soon 
became one of the major approaches of the United Nations in 
trying to further the peaceful settlement of conflicts. During 
that stage the Secretary-General thought that the United 
Nations should turn its primary attention to Cold War conflicts 
and to control and moderate those conflicts that constitute an 
immediate danger to world peace and that above all "the East- 
West conflict must command first attention in day-to-day 
decisions.
E. Dealing with conflicts outside the Blocs:
Later on the Secretary-General adopted a new strategy.
He felt that the UN should concentrate on resolving conflicts
which were outside the territorial spheres of the blocs. The
Secretary-General noted that the Organization should concern
itself primarily with the conflicts between the countries of
Africa and Asia rather than with the threat of a military clash
between the Western and Communist states in Europe or the Far 
142East. He thought that the United Nations could seldom
influence conflicts involving primary interests of the blocs
140. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York, The 
Macmillan Co., 1954).
141. UN Doc. A/2404, 21 July 1953, p.XI.
142. UN Doc. A/2911, 8 July 1955 and UN Doc. A/3137, Add.l, 
4 October 1956.
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because the veto provision would make it impossible for the 
Security Council to act and because the General Assembly could 
seldom concert the political power which would be necessary to 
influence one of the super-powers. In his 1960 Introduction 
he wrote: "With its constitution and structure, it is
extremely difficult for the United Nations to exercise an 
influence on problems which are clearly and definitely within 
the orbit of present day conflicts between power blocs... 
Whatever the attitude of the General Assembly and the Security 
Council, it is in such cases also practically impossible for 
the Secretary-General to operate effectively with the means put 
at his disposal.
His new strategy did not emerge in practice until the
crisis in the Middle East in 1956, and it was not clearly
144outlined until 1960. Also agreement may be achieved to
143. Foote (ed.), ibid., p.302.
144. In his 1960 Introduction he wrote that 'Preventive action
...must in the first place aim at filling the vacuum so 
that it will not provoke action from any of the major 
parties, tne initiative for which might be taken for 
preventive purposes but might in burn lead to counter 
action from the other side. The ways in which a vacuum 
can be filled by the United Nations so as to forestall 
such initiatives differ from case to case, but they have 
this in common: temporarily, and pending the filling of
d vacuum by the normal means, the United Nations enters 
the pictures on the basis of its non-commitment to any 
power bloc, so as to provide to the extent possible a 
guarantee in relation to all parties against initiatives 
from others.' 'Whatever the countries concerned call 
themselves, non-committed, neutral, neutralist or 
something else, they have all found it not to be in 
harmony with their role and interests in world politics, 
in a general sense, to any one of the blocs or to any 
specific line of action supported by one of the sides in 
the major conflicts.' Foote (ed.), ibid., pp.302, 303.
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discuss the case in the UN because of mutual interest among
the big Powers to avoid having a regional or local conflict
drawn into the sphere of bloc politics.
The initiative and responsibility given to the Secretary-
General is one of the most significant development in UN
history. It seems to me that the statement which Dag
Hammarskjöld made on 31 October 1956 will be considered as a
sound and forceful exposition of the responsibility of the
Secretary-General and his staff. He said:
...I wish to make the following declaration: The
principles of the Charter are, by far, greater than 
the Organization in which they are embodied, and 
the aims which they are to safeguard are holier 
than the policies of any single nation or people.
As a servant of the Organization the Secretary- 
General has the duty to maintain his usefulness 
by avoiding public stands on conflicts between 
Member nations unless and until such an action 
might help to resolve the conflict. However, the 
discretion and impartiality thus imposed on the 
Secretary-General by the character of his immediate 
task, may not degenerate into a policy of expediency.
He must also be a servant of the principles of the 
Charter, and its aims must ultimately determine what 
for him is right and wrong. For that he must stand.
A Secretary-General cannot serve on any other 
assumption than that - within the necessary limits 
of human frailty and honest differences of opinion - 
all Member nations honor their pledge to observe all 
articles of the Charter. He should also be able to 
assume that those organs which are charged with the 
task of upholding the Charter, will be in a position 
to fulfil their task. The bearing of what I have 
just said must be obvious to all without any 
elaboration from my side. Were the Members to 
consider that another view of the duties of the 
Secretary-General than the one herestated would 
better serve the interests of the Organization, it 
is their obvious right to act accordingly.145
In the course of the meeting the representatives of the Great
Powers including France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and
145. Ibid., pp.123-124, Statement at the time of the Suez 
crisis on the Duties of the Secretary-General, before 
the Security Council, 31 October 1956.
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the United States, as well as other members, indicated their 
acceptance of this statement of the right and duty of the 
Secretary-General to speak and act in support of the principles 
of the Charter in such circumstances. He made a second statement 
on 4 November 1956 before the Security Council at the time of the 
Hungarian crisis. "...I would like to put on record that the 
observations I made on that occasion (the Suez crisis) obviously 
apply also to the present situation.
5. His Role in Peace-Keeping Operations.
The most unusual extension of the concept of the 
international secretariat has been the involvement of the 
military profession in peace-keeping activities under the 
direction of the Secretary-General. The role of the Secretary- 
General as executive agent of the United Nations in peace-keeping 
operations was very important to the Organization's duty to 
promote international peace and security. The operating 
responsibilities for the Secretary-General are in fact a part of 
every peace-keeping operation authorised either by the Security 
Council or by the General Assembly. As we have demonstrated 
above all members have shown that they were willing to allow the 
Secretary-General to play a role in peace-keeping operations and 
no member has challenged this role. The differences of opinion 
relate to whether he is to function as a purely administrative 
or as an independent agent within the limits laid down by the 
authorising organ.
Dag Hammarskjöld left a strong personal imprint on the 
creation of the United Nations peace-keeping forces. In his 
report of 6 November 1956 he mentioned three courses of action 
which may be chosen to direct the peace-keeping forces:
146. Ibid., p.125.
103
1. To charge a country or group of countries with the 
responsibility of organising a force whose purpose was 
determined by the United Nations (Korea).
2. To allow a group of countries to organise a force which
would be brought into a formal relationship with the
Organization at a later date (the British and French
suggestion that the United Nations charge them with
147certain functions).
The Secretary-General noted that it would be
difficult to establish a real independence for such a
United Nations force, as mentioned above, from the states
148which contributed troops to it.
3. To direct the force under the General Assembly or the
14 9Security Council.
To the Secretary-General, this would mean that the 
chief officer of the force should be appointed by the 
United Nations and that he, in his functions, should be 
responsible to the General Assembly or the Security
Council. He should be fully independent of the policies
, .. 150of any one nation.
I. The framework of the forces 
During his term in office Hammarskjöld emphasised the 
application of the following principles:
A. Consent of the host country:
The consent of the host country must be obtained. The 
Secretary-General in his second report on the creation of UNEF
147. UN Doc. A/3293 and A/3294, 6 November 1956.
148. UN Doc. A/3302, 6 November 1956, para 4-5.
149. Ibid., paras 4-5.
150. UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, para 172.
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on 6 November 1956 wrote that "the Force, if established,
would be limited in its operations to the extent that consent
of the parties concerned is required under generally
recognized international law. While the General Assembly is
enabled to-establish-the Force with the consent of these
parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not
request the Force to be-stationed-or-operate-on the territory
of a given country without the consent of the Government of 
151that country." Moreover, the Secretary-General believed
that establishment of any forces, not to be used for
enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter, had to
be on a voluntary basis. He noted that "as the arrangements
discussed in the report do not cover the type of force
envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter, it follows from
international law and the Charter ...that the consent of a
Member nation is necessary for the United Nations to use its
152military personnel or material."
B. The right of host State:
In his Summary Report of the UNEF, the Secretary- 
General summarised the principles which guide the right of 
host States to determine the inclusion of troops from 
certain countries. He wrote: "It would seem desirable
to accept the formula applied in the case of UNEF, which is 
to the effect that, while it is for the United Nations 
alone to decide on the composition of military elements 
sent to a country, the United Nations should in deciding on 
composition, take fully into account the view of the host
151. UN Doc. A/3322, 6 November 1956, para 9.
152. UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, para 155.
105
Government as one of the most serious factors which should
guide the recruitment of the personnel. Usually, this is
likely to mean that serious objections by the host country
in the United Nations operation will determine the action of
153the Organization." But host States should not be able to
determine the functions of or to expel certain national forces
once they have accepted them in the UN Forces. The Secretary-
General refused to accept the demands of Prime Minister
154Lumumba to use only African troops in Katanga and also did
not accept General Mobutu's demand to remove Ghanaian and
155Guinean troops from ONUC.
C. Self-Defence:
Since peace-keeping forces were not created for
enforcement operations, they should use force only in self-
defence. The logical interpretation of the term "self-defence"
has meant that the troops could fire only when their lives were
threatened. But that was not the case in the Congo operation.
All the major military actions in Katanga were justified as
using force in defence of ONUC's freedom of movement while it
156was carrying out its mandates. Self-defence was widely
interpreted in this case as permitting ONUC to use force to 
achieve its goals.
153. UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, para 161.
154. Gordon King, United Nations in the Congo, A Quest for 
Peace, New York, Carnegoe Endowment for International 
Peace, 1962, p.45.
155. A.G. Mezerik (ed.), Congo and the United Nations, Vol.l, 
New York, International Review Service, 1960, p.20.
156. UN Doc. S/4940/Add.16-19, 1-16 December 1961, UN Doc. 
S/5053/Add.14, 11 January 1963.
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D. Great Powers and States with interest in the crisis 
are excluded;
No permanent members of the Security Council should
participate in peace-keeping forces nor should any states
having a special interest in the conflict. The Secretary-
General thought that to decrease the conflicts threat to
international peace, the troops of the Great Powers or of the
states which had a special interest in the crisis must be
157excluded from the forces.
E. Non-intervention in internal politics:
The Secretary-General made it quite clear that peace­
keeping forces should not intervene in the internal politics 
of the host country. In his report of 6 November 1956 he 
stated: "The force obviously should have no rights other than
those necessary for the execution of its functions, in 
cooperation with local authorities. It would be more than an
observers corps, but in no way a military force temporarily
158controlling the territory in which it is stationed," and in
his UNEF Summary Report he added: "authority granted to the
United Nations group cannot be exercised within a given
territory either in competition with representatives of the
host Government or in cooperation with them on the basis of
any joint operation. Thus, a United Nations operation must be
separate and distinct from activities by national 
159authorities." The Secretary-General emphasised the
application of this principle when he proposed the creation of 
ONUC to the Security Council, stating that the force "may not
157. UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, para 160.
158. UN Doc. A/3302, 6 November 1956, para 11.
159. UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958, para 165.
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take any action which would make them a party to internal
16 0conflicts in this country." The Secretary-General was
obliged to ask the Security Council to support him in
protecting his stand against attempts to provoke it during
161the Congo crisis. The Security Council gave its support.
F. Not to impose settlements;
The force should not try to influence the outcome of the
dispute and should not be involved in imposing settlements on
host countries. In his report on the creation of UNEF on
6 November 1956, the Secretary-General noted clearly: "It
follows from its terms of reference that there is no intent in
the establishment of the force to influence the military
balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political
16?balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict." He
noted also that this was a "necessary limitation on any United
Nations forces which were not created under the enforcement
161Articles of Chapter VII of the Charter." The Secretary-
General emphasised that "The Organization must...maintain that 
the "status jurio" existing prior to such military action be 
re-established by a withdrawal of troops.
II. The Secretary-General initiatives 
In view of the hard and rapid decision-making required 
for peace-keeping, the organisation could not function at all 
without initiatives on the part of the Secretary-General. In
160. Security Council, Official Records, 873rd meeting (13-14 
July 1960), para 28.
161. UN Doc. S/4426 (1960).
162. UN Doc. A/3302, 6 November 1956, para 8.
163. UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 1958.
164. UN Doc. A/3512, 24 January 1957.
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the West Irian operation, the General Assembly resolution
authorised the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations
Administrator for the mission, to provide such security forces
as the Administrator deemed necessary, to receive the reports
of the Administrator and to have the choice whether to submit
his own reports to the General Assembly or to Member States.
The Soviet Union voted for the resolution. In this instance
the Soviets showed that they were willing to allow the
Secretary-General to function as freely as most members of the
UN would like."^“* The issue of validity of the Secretary-
General's powers was raised in connection with the Security
Council resolution about the Cyprus force, which recommended
that "The composition and size of the force shall be
established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the
Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
The Commander of the force shall be appointed by the Secretary-
166General and report to him." This resolution was, of course,
discussed by the powers prior to its acceptance. In the 
separate vote on the above portion of the resolution the 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and France registered their 
objections in principle by abstaining, but the resolution was 
unanimously approved as a whole. The French delegate remarked 
that the Council was going very far in the direction of the 
delegation of powers to grant them to a single individual. In 
practice, there is no evidence that the Secretary-General was 
unable to function because of attempts to limit his ability by 
the great powers. In two operations in India during 1965 and
165. GA Res. 1752 (XVII).
166. See Chapter 2.
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1966, the great powers granted a vast authority to the
Secretary-General. On 6 September 1965 the Security Council
adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General "to
take all measures possible to strengthen the United Nations
X 6 7Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan." On
20 September 1965 the Council with affirmative votes from the
USA, Soviet Union, and France, requested the Secretary-General
"to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of
168the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel." The
Secretary-General reported that he decided to organise the 
Observers "whose function it is to supervise the cease-fire 
and withdrawals as an organization separate from UNMOGIP 
entitled United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission 
(UNIPOM)." Thus a new peace-keeping operation was created by 
the Secretary-General within the mandate of the Security 
Council. The Soviet Union has her own ideas about the areas 
of responsibility that should be denied to the Secretary- 
General such as the task and functions of the armed forces, 
their numbers and composition, their command structure, the 
duration of their service in the field, the direction of their 
operations, and the mode of financing the necessary 
expenditures. No one else, no other organ, no person, no 
official of the United Nations is empowered to carry out such 
actions in measures relating to the use of armed forces, and 
the actions undertaken by the Secretary-General in this field, 
depart from the provisions of the UN Charter in accordance with
167. See Chapter 2.
168. SC Res. 211, 20 September 1965.
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169which only the Security Council is competent to adopt.
The French prefer a narrow conception of the authority to the
170Secretary-General in peace-keeping decisions.
6. Back to Normal.
It is beyond dispute that the Secretary-General assumed
an independent influence in international politics. This
clearly occurred where the Security Council or the General
Assembly gave the Secretary-General mandates with a certain
amount of independent decision-making authority. The
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld wrote in this connection
"...the development reflects an incipient growth of
possibilities for the Organization to operate in specific
cases within a latitude of independence in practice given to
171it by its Members' governments for such cases...."
Hammarskjöld's views on the independent influence of the
Secretary-General were noted and criticised by Dr Conor Cruse 
172O'Brien, who wrote:
...the theory was this: the Secretary-General
represented the general will of the international 
community as a whole, independent of the will of 
any individual member or group of members; where the 
other organs of the Charter, the Security Council and 
the General Assembly, had failed to reach agreement 
or, as more often happened, had reached only ambiguous 
agreement, the Secretary-General, and under him the 
Secretariat, could be, and ought to be, trusted to act 
in the general interest of all. In this way, and 
through such situations, the authority of the Secretary- 
General and the Secretariat were to be gradually built 
up in the direction, it was hoped, ultimately of a
169. I.P.K.O. Documentation, July 1967, No.17.
170. I.P.K.O., Ibid., No.18.
171. Foote (ed.), ibid., pp.227-28 (From the introduction to 
the Annual Report 1958-1959, 22 August 1959).
172. Conor Cruse O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1962, pp.15-16.
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genuinely supranational authority - a world 
government... I do not believe however that we are 
helping the tendency in that direction by pretending 
that we have already reached a state which we have 
not in fact reached: a stage where the Secretary-
General and the Secretariat can be implicitly relied 
on as an impartial instrument in the service of the 
international community as a whole, influenced by no 
national policies.
Hammarskjöld described in his speech at Oxford in May 1961 the
means by which he could maintain international impartiality
17 3and remain responsive to the wishes of the Members, and
also stated in the same speech:
...non-action may be tempting; it enables him to 
avoid criticism by refusing to act until other 
political organs resolve the dilemma. An easy 
refuge may thus appear to be available. But would 
such refuge be compatible with the responsibility 
placed upon the Secretary-General by the Charter?
Is he entitled to refuse to carry out the decision 
properly reached by the organs, on the ground that 
the specific implementation would be opposed to 
positions some Member States might wish to take, as 
indicated perhaps, by an earlier minority vote? Of 
course the political organs may always instruct him 
to discontinue the implementation of a resolution 
remains in effect, is the Secretary-General legally 
and morally free to take no action, particularly in 
a matter considered to affect international peace 
and security?... The answers seem clear enough in law, 
the responsibilities of the Secretary-General under 
the Charter cannot be laid aside merely because the 
execution of decisions by him is likely to be 
politically controversial. The Secretary-General 
remains under the obligation to carry out the 
policies as adopted by the organs, the essential 
requirement is that he does this on the basis of his 
exclusively international responsibility and not in 
the interest of any particular State or groups of 
States.
Others thought that Hammarskjöld's conception of the
174Organization was too ambitious. One of his critics has
173. 'The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact'. 
Lecture delivered to Congregation at Oxford University, 
30 May 1961 (Foote, ed.), ibid., p.329.
174. Hans J. Morgenthau, 'The United Nations of Dag 
Hammarskjöld is Dead', The New York Times, 14 March 
1965, Section VI, p.32.
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felt that the reaction to his policies has been so great that
1 7 S"the UN of Dag Hammarskjöld is dead." "The UN presided
over by the late Secretary-General was an effective
international instrument, then, it has succumbed to ills
inherent in the Charter many years ago, plus others since 
176acquired." "The UN which Dag Hammarskjöld molded into a
177dynamic instrument of governments is dead." But there were
those who believed that Hammarskjöld was working in very
complicated circumstances that forced him to assume a
responsibility which was unfair to him, as a man, and beyond
178the true function of his office. We cannot ignore the role
of Hammarskjöld in encouraging the expansion of the Secretary- 
General's practices, particularly in creating the United 
Nations peace-keeping operations and the choice of the 
Secretary-General as their executive director. The main 
criticism has arisen regarding his independent role in this 
connection. We could not deny that the Secretary-General in 
his role as executive agent for peace-keeping operations has 
political power over some matters. But Hammarskjöld perhaps 
overstressed the bureaucratic character of his post at the 
expense of its political roles. When U Thant became UN 
Secretary-General on 3 November 1961 after the death of 
Hammarskjöld, and for ten years until he resigned in December 
1971, he sought to bring the family of nations closer together. 
But these ten years were a period of far-reaching changes, a
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid.
177. Ibid.
178. K. Twitchett, ibid., p.80.
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thaw in East-West relations ending the cold war, the emergence 
of the non-aligned countries, which argued that the absence of 
war did not automatically imply either peace or welfare for 
everyone, and a new policy of co-existence and dialogue 
adopted by the great powers. Fully aware of the loftiness of 
the goals of peace and the limited means for achieving them,
U Thant gave the activities of the world organisation a 
character which was appropriate to the times, and discussed 
and moved with more caution. His successor, Kurt Waldheim, 
has recognised the reality - that whatever the men at the top 
may do, the only real power in the Glass House today comes 
from 35 floors down where the Security Council and General 
Assembly meet.
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Chapter 5
The United Nations Financial Crisis
1. The Financial Powers as Regarded by the Charter.
The Charter provisions with regard to the budget are 
embodied in Articles 17, 18 and 19. Article 17 reads as 
follows:
1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve 
the budget of the Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne 
by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve 
any financial and budgetary arrangements with 
specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and 
shall examine the administrative budgets of such 
specialized agencies with a view to making 
recommendations to the agencies concerned.
As stated in Article 18, decisions 'shall be made by a
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These
questions shall include...budgetary questions.' Article 19
reads as follows:
A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears 
in the payment of its financial contributions to the 
Organization shall have no vote in the General 
Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or 
exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it 
for the preceding two full years. The General 
Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member 
to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay 
is due to conditions beyond the control of the 
Member.
Accordingly, the financial powers lie with the General 
Assembly. It was to apportion the budget among the member 
states. The budgetary questions are to be decided by a two- 
thirds majority and if a member state failed to pay its 
financial contributions it might lose its voting rights in 
the General Assembly. The collection of contributions for 
the regular budget has not posed a serious problem, the total
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arrears never exceeding 15 per cent of the entire budget.
Until the United Nations engaged in peace-keeping operations, 
the budget never in fact became a problem in the Organization's 
disputes.
2. UNEF and ONUC threatened the Entire Financial Structure of 
the United Nations.
There have existed four financing methods to operate 
United Nations Forces: the first is financing by states that
benefit directly from the presence of peace-keeping forces.
Two operations have been funded in this way by agreement of 
the parties concerned; this method will be adequate for 
operations of particularly limited size, cost and duration.
By agreement in Yemen in 1963, Saudi Arabia and the UAR 
consented to pay the mission's costs in equally divided shares. 
The Netherlands and Indonesia shared the costs for the seven- 
month peace-keeping operation in West Irian. A second 
financing method was used for the first time in the Cyprus 
operation; it is financed entirely by voluntary contributions 
from member states. The third financing method, which was in 
common use before the financial crisis provoked by UNEF and 
ONUC, was financing of the operations out of the regular 
budget and, if needed, by transferring available funds from 
one budget category to another. Operations on the India- 
Pakistan border, and in Kashmir have been financed in this 
way. Each fiscal year the General Assembly authorises in the 
regular budget the equivalent of a 'contingency fund' 
empowering the Secretary-General to finance obligations not 
provided for in the regular budget. Up to $2 million of this 
fund may be used to cover expenses of any operation that is 
authorised by the Secretary-General as relating to the
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maintenance of peace and security. The fourth financing
method used, the so-called apportionment system, has been
used to finance UNEF expenditures from 1965 on. For example,
the total estimated costs for 1965 were apportioned among the
United Nations Member States, a little over five per cent of
this total was apportioned on a capacity-to-pay principle
among the large majority of states, the remaining 95 per cent
17 9was distributed among twenty-six developed states.
It is clear that activities of all United Nations organs
are financed from the regular budget, but when the General
Assembly passed its resolution concerning the creating of
UNEF in November 1956 it was the first time that the UN
decided that the costs of such an international force should
be shared by the world community. The Secretary-General
recommended that a Special Account outside the regular budget
be set up for UNEF and that the costs of the Force be shared
by the member states on the basis of the scale of assessments
to be adopted for the 1957 budget. Moreover, he asked for
$10,000,000 to meet the urgent needs of the Force. The General
Assembly established the Special Account on 26 November 1956;
but when the Secretary-General asked on 3 December for the
balance of the expenses to be shared in accordance with the
1957 scale of assessments a storm of controversy divided the 
180Assembly. The Soviet Union and France objected on the
ground that UNEF was illegal in a fundamental sense, since
179. UNGA Res. 2115 (XX) United Nations Emergency Forces 
(1407th Plenary Meeting, 21 December 1965).
180. United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, 11th 
Session, 5th Committee, 541st Meeting, 3 December 1956.
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only the Security Council had the right to authorise peace­
keeping operations. Once again in 1960 the Secretary-General 
defended the principle of 'collective responsibility' with 
regard to the financing of ONUC. The Fifth Committee of the 
General Assembly, by a vote of 45 to 15 with 25 abstentions, 
endorsed the view of the Secretary-General and recommended an 
ad hoc account for the expenses of ONUC, to be assessed on the 
basis of the 1960 scale. The Soviets argued that ONUC 
financing should be governed by the unanimity principle in the 
Security Council. The Congo crisis revealed a dispute over the
political direction of the UN Force, which led to Soviet 
181refusal to finance the operations. This aggravated the 
pre-existing position over the financing of UNEF, and led to 
a financial crisis, which produced a direct ct^llenjeto the 
authority of the General Assembly. On 24 October 1960, the 
Secretary-General estimated the cost of the Congo Force for 
1960 at $66,625,000. The Advisory Committee on Administrative 
and Budgetary Questions recommended that the total costs of 
ONUC for 1960 be held to $60,000,000. In the Fifth Committee, 
Ireland, Liberia and Sweden suggested that ONUC's 1960 expenses 
be included with the regular budget and apportioned in 
accordance with the 1960 scale of assessments. This would 
clearly bring ONUC within the scope of Articles 17 and 19 of 
the Charter. Pakistan, Senegal and Tunisia proposed to create 
an ad hoc account for financing ONUC, but clearly agreed that
181. The Soviet Union stated its intention not to contribute 
to part of ONUC's expenses since in its opinion, 'The 
main burden...should be borne by the Chief culprits - 
the Belgian Colonizers'. GAOR, Fifteenth Session, Fifth 
Committee, 775th Meeting, 26 October 1960, para 8.
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the costs were to constitute expenses of the Organization within
the meaning of Article 17. This technique would make it a
collective responsibility, but would keep it separate from the
regular budget for accounting purposes. The Soviets declared
that they would not contribute to any part of ONUC's expenses,
arguing that the main burden should be borne by Belgium, and by
voluntary contributions. The Latin American countries suggested
that the expenses be paid largely by the permanent members of the
Security Council. The Fifth Committee, by a vote of 45 to 15 with
25 abstentions, approved the draft resolution proposed by
Pakistan, Tunisia and Senegal. On 20 December 1960, this
recommendation was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of
46 to 17 with 24 abstentions, "The General Assembly, ...
'Recognizing that the expenses involved in the United Nations
operations in the Congo for 1960 constitute 'expenses of the
Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, ...'Decides to
establish an ad hoc account for the expenses of the United Nations
182in the Congo..". On 20 December 1961, the General Assembly
decided to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory 
opinion on the question: did the expenditures authorised by the
General Assembly for UNEF and ONUC constitute expenses of the
183Organization within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter?
3. The Advisory Opinion of the I.C.J.
In May 1962, the proceedings were held before the World
184Court which, on 20 July 1962 by a nine to five majority, 
gave an opinion that the expenditures authorised in the
182. UNGA Resolution 1583 (XV), 960th Plenary Meeting,
20 December 1960.
183. UN General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Official Records, 
Annexes, Agenda Item No.62 (1961), and UN Doc. A/PV 1086 
(20 December 1961).
International Court of Justice. Advisory Opinion of 20 July 
1962. Ibid.
184.
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General Assembly resolutions dealing with the financing of
UNEF and ONUC constituted expenses of the Organization within
the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter, thereby
confirming the authority of the General Assembly to make the
controversial assessment. The Court lacked basic agreement
on the legal foundations of its decision, with three of the
185nine majority judges writing separate opinions and one
186making a verbal declaration, while each of the five
187dissenting judges delivered a separate written opinion.
This lack of consensus deprived the Court's ruling of much of 
its force.
The Court noted that an expenditure made for one of the 
purposes of the Organization could be viewed as an expense of 
the Organization. It declared that the UNEF had been created 
by the General Assembly in order to maintain peace and 
security in the Middle East, had been established with the 
consent of the states concerned, including that of the host 
state, Egypt, and was obviously not an enforcement force.
The majority concluded that the costs of UNEF were to be 
regarded as expenses of the Organization within the meaning 
of Article 17(2). The Court pointed out also that ONUC had 
been authorised by the Security Council, and that it had been 
invited by the Congo to promote and maintain peace and 
security. The majority concluded that 'It is impossible to 
reach the conclusion that the operations in question usurped
185. Sir Percy Spender, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Gaetano 
Morelli.
186. Judge Speropoulos.
187. President Winiarski, Jules Basdevant, V. Koretsky, 
Lucio M. Moreno Quintana and J.F. Bustamante.
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or impinged upon the prerogatives conferred by the Charter
on the Security Council. The Charter does not forbid the
Security Council to act through instruments of its own choice:
under Article 29 it may establish such subsidiary organs as
it deems necessary for the performance of its function; under
Article 98 it may entrust other functions to the Secretary- 
188General.' Therefore the Secretary-General could be
authorised to carry out decisions involving the maintenance 
of peace and security. The majority concluded that ONUC 
actions did not involve enforcement measures, therefore its 
costs were to be regarded as expenses of the Organization.
The Court affirmed the competence of the Assembly in matters 
of peace and security and clarified that recommendations made 
by the Assembly or the Council establishing subsidiary organs 
for peace and security purposes were not enforcement action. 
The Court found that the provisions of the Charter which 
distribute functions and powers to the Security Council and 
to the General Assembly give no support to the view that such 
distribution excludes from the powers of the General Assembly 
the power to finance measures designed to maintain peace and 
security as long as these measures are consistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations and outside the scope of 
Chapter VII. The Court noted carefully that the decision to 
approve the budget had a close connection with Article 17, 
paragraph 2, since the General Assembly was given the power to 
apportion the expenses among the Members and the exercise of 
the power of apportionment creates the obligation, specially 
stated in Article 17, paragraph 2, of each Member to bear the
188. International Court of Justice, ibid., pp.176-177.
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share of the costs apportioned to it by the General Assembly.
When these costs include expenditures for the maintenance of
peace and security, it is the General Assembly which has the
authority to apportion the latter amounts among the 
189Members. However, two Judges in the minority rejected,
and three others seriously questioned, the role of the
190Assembly in matters of peace and security, as they felt 
that the distinction between the General Assembly and the 
Security Council in this field should be maintained. To Judge 
Koretsky, the entire issue was political. He considered UNEF 
and ONUC as enforcement actions carried out in direct 
violation of the Charter, as there existed no obligation to 
form them. Judge Winiarski also denied the legality of the 
UNEF and ONUC resolutions. He went further by noting that if 
the expenditures were expenses of the Organization, no legal 
obligation to pay necessarily followed, since Assembly 
resolutions had only the status of recommendations.
The Court gave its approval to both the Assembly and the 
Council to create peace-keeping operations, provided they are 
in accord with the purposes of the Charter, and arranged for 
their financial support. The Seventeenth General Assembly 
decided to accept the opinion by a large majority of 76 to 17, 
with eight abstentions, and by so doing affirmed that the 
expenditures on the Congo and the Middle East operations were 
expenses within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of 
the Charter.
189. Ibid., p.164.
190. The three Judges were: Jules Basdevant, Moreno Quintana
and Bustamante.
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4. ftr^ume-Kts on ^ o u ^ ’* opinion
The problem of the United Nations forces is complicated 
by the continued refusal of France, the Soviet Union and other 
members to accept the Court's opinion and consider the cost of 
such forces as a charge on the regular budget of the UN to be 
apportioned among the members of the General Assembly. The 
advisory opinion thus did not clear the way for a definitive 
solution of the financial crisis.
Two main opposing views emerged from the arguments on
this issue: a Western, or rather an American view, and a
Soviet view. The most explicit statement of Western policy is
contained in a note by the United Kingdom and a memorandum by
191the United States in reply to a previous Soviet memorandum.
1. Article 24 of the Charter gives the Security Council 
'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security', but does not give it authority. The 
Charter provisions set forth unequivocally the authority of 
the General Assembly in this regard. Article 10 authorises 
the General Assembly to discuss and make recommendations on 
any questions or matters within the scope of the Charter. 
Article 11, paragraph 2, authorises the Assembly to 'discuss 
any questions relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security brought before it by any Members of the 
United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a State 
which is not a member of the United Nations... and except as 
provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard 
to any such questions to the State or States concerned....Any 
such question on which action is necessary shall be referred
191. General Assembly, Official Records, XIXth Session (1964- 
1965), Annex No.21, pp.4-6, 10-18.
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to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before 
or after discussion.' The word 'action' in the exception to 
Article 11, paragraph 2, applies, as the opinion of the 
majority of the I.C.J. have stated, to 'action which is solely 
within the province of the Security Council.' In other words, 
the exception to Article 11, paragraph 2, does not apply where 
the necessary action is not enforcement action. If the 
Security Council does have the sole authority, under Chapter 
VII, to make binding decisions, obligatory and compulsory on 
all Members, for coercive or enforcement action, that does not 
mean the General Assembly cannot make recommendations (as 
opposed to binding decisions) as to the preservation of the 
peace.
2. Few Members of the United Nations would ever agree 
that if the Security Council proves itself unable to act in 
the face of an international emergency, the General Assembly 
can only stand by, motionless and powerless, to take any step 
for the preservation of peace. Here we find a political 
argument, reintroducing the much debated Resolution on 
'Uniting for Peace'.
3. The claimed exclusive rights of the Security Council 
as to peace-keeping expenses have no justification in the 
Charter. Actually this argument, drawn from national 
constitutional systems is not relevant here. If we consider 
that peace-keeping forces imply a certain degree of enforcement, 
as the Soviet Union does consider, only Article 43 is applicable 
and not Article 17. Therefore the expenses of peace-keeping 
forces are solely within the competence of the Security 
Council and are not 'expenses of the Organization' under
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Article 17, and cannot be included in the calculation of 
arrears under Article 19.
The most explicit statement of Soviet policy was
a.
contained in two memorandums dated 10 July 1964 and 11
September 1964 and transmitted to the Secretary-General of
192the United Nations.
1. Under the Charter, the only body authorised to take 
action in the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace and security is the Security Council. It is likewise 
within the purview of the Security Council to adopt decisions 
in all matters relating to the establishment of the United 
Nations armed forces, the definition of their duties, their 
composition and strength, the direction of their operations, 
the structure of their command and the duration of their stay 
in the area of operation, and also matters of financing. No 
other United Nations body, including the General Assembly, has 
the right under the Charter to decide these matters.
2. These provisions form the only basis on which it is 
possible to ensure that the United Nations armed forces may 
not be used in the narrow unilateral interest of any individual 
States or groups of States to the detriment of the interests
of other States. The Soviet memorandum added, 'this basis is 
the agreement of the permanent members of the Security Council 
on all fundamental matters relating to the establishment, 
utilization and financing of United Nations armed forces in 
each particular case.' Therefore, the establishment of UNEF 
under Resolution 998(ES-1) of 4 November 1956, and Resolution
192. General Assembly, Official Records, XIXth Session (1964- 
1965), Annex No.21, pp.2-4, 6-10.
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1000(ES-1) of 5 November 1956 was carried out in violation of 
the United Nations Charter. As for the ONUC case, the 
Secretary-General 'bypassing the Security Council, himself 
determined the group of States which were invited to take 
part.' Furthermore 'the provisions of the Charter were not 
observed in relation to the direction of the United Nations 
operations in the Congo.'
3. It is natural, therefore, that financial obligations 
for the Members of the United Nations can arise only out of 
such actions of the United Nations as conform to its Charter. 
As to expenses connected with actions which do not conform to 
the Charter, such actions cannot give rise to obligations for 
Member States with regard to the payment of expenses.
With regard to Article 17 of the Charter it is obvious 
that the phrase 'expenses of the Organization' does not by 
any means signify 'all the expenses of the Organization' but 
only the expenses under the budget, i.e. the 'normal' expenses 
of the United Nations. Expenditure for United Nations armed 
forces and other matters connected with the establishment and 
operations of such forces are governed by provisions of 
Chapter VII of the Charter and fall within the competence of 
the Security Council. Accordingly, there can be no question 
of applying Article 19 of the Charter not only in connection 
with the cost of maintaining the Emergency Force in the Middle 
East and the armed forces in the Congo, but also in cases 
where United Nations armed forces are created and employed in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter.
The confrontation between the superpowers over the 
application of Article 19 of the Charter ended before the 
opening of the XXth Session of the General Assembly when the
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United States dropped its request to deprive the Soviet Union 
of its right to vote in the General Assembly. On 16 August 
1965, Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg of the United States 
announced that 'the United States regretfully accepted the
simple and inescapable fact of life that a majority of 114
193Member States was unready to apply Article 19.'
The desire of the members to resolve the financial crisis 
was reflected in the General Assembly decision to establish 
the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations with the 
task of conducting a comprehensive review of peace-keeping
operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming
194the financial difficulties of the Organization.
The Committee reached a consensus on the present 
financial crisis of the United Nations:
a) that the General Assembly will carry on its 
work normally in accordance with its rules of 
procedure.
b) that the question of the applicability of 
Article 19 will not be raised with regard to 
the United Nations Emergency Force and the 
United Nations Operations in the Congo.
c) that the financial difficulties of the
Organization should be solved through voluntary
contributions by member states, with the highly
developed countries making substantial 
195contributions.
193. J. Stoessinger, 'The United Nations and the Superpowers', 
New York, 1965, pp.108-109.
194. Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary- 
General on the Work of the Organization (covering the 
period from 16 June 1964 to 15 June 1965), UN Monthly 
Chronicle, Vol.2, No.9, October 1965, pp.92-117 (Res.
2006 (XIX), 8 February 1965).
UN Chronicle, August-September 1965, p.17.195.
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Although the Committee had provided a forum for frank 
expression, and a number of new ideas and proposals had 
emerged from the discussions, it had failed in the most 
important task assigned to it, i.e. to reach agreement on 
rules and guidelines to govern future peace-keeping operations, 
especially with regard to the establishment, composition, 
command, control, and financing of the forces.
Actually it is extremely difficult in the present 
circumstances to reach any substantial agreement on future 
peace-keeping operations. The crucial problem which confronts 
members is neither financial nor even constitutional, but 
political. Each of the two superpowers want to be sure of 
having an advantageous position with regard to future 
operations; or at least they want to ensure that peace-keeping 
forces may not be used in the unilateral interest of any 
superpowers.
This financial crisis was in reality a political crisis 
over the proper role which the United Nations should play in 
the national policies of its Member States, particularly the 
superpowers. Thus it becomes unlikely that the United Nations 
would again venture into massive peace-keeping operations 
without the consent of the superpowers. The first peace­
keeping operation which was created after that was when the 
Security Council deployed a UN emergency force between Egyptian 
and Israeli forces, after the October 1973 war. The Council 
agreed that the costs of the force should be considered as 
expenses of the Organization, to be borne by Members as 
apportioned by the General Assembly. In December 1973, the
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196Assembly approved a plan to appropriate the sum of $30
million for the operation from 25 October 1973 to 24 April
1974. An amount of $18,945,000 was to be apportioned among
the permanent members of the Security Council in the
proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974- 
1971976, $10,434,000 among the economically developed Member
States which are not permanent members of the Security Council 
in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 
1974-1976, $606,000 to be apportioned among the economically 
less-developed Member States and $15,000 to be apportioned to 
the following countries among the economically less-developed 
Member States in the proportions determined by the scale of 
assessments for 1974-1976: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Botswana,
Burundi, Chad, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Haiti, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Nepal, Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Upper Volta and Yemen. By the above-mentioned 
resolution the General Assembly provided a forum for frank 
expression that the financial difficulties of peace-keeping 
operations should be solved through voluntary contributions 
by member states, with the highly developed countries making 
substantial contributions.
196. GA Res. 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973.
197. GA Res. 3062 (XXVIII).
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion
The United Nations is not a static body, but a living
organism which adjusts itself to the shifting needs of the
time. It will keep developing in accordance with the
evolution of the international environment. The development
and strengthening of the United Nations as an effective
instrument for the preservation and maintenance of
international peace and security V3S a hccesityAs the
system of collective security b e c a h i e , deadlocked, this vital
function Vc? S performed through an alternative device,
i.e. UN peace-keeping operations. The aim was, therefore, to
replace the improvisations of the past by accepted procedures
and methods, defined responsibilities and improved organisation
in the whole field of authorisation, control and financing of
peace-keeping operations. Also a reserve of men, material,
transport and funds was thought to be required, which could
be mobilised whenever a crisis threatened international peace.
This task was assigned to a special committee on peace-keeping
operations, composed of 33 members. It has to undertake a
comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping
operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming
198the financial difficulties of the Organization.
Although the Committee had provided a forum for frank 
expression, and a number of new ideas and proposals had 
emerged from the discussions, it had failed in the most 
important task assigned to it, i.e. to reach agreement on rules
198. GA Res. 2006 (XIX), 8 February 1965.
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and guidelines to govern future peace-keeping operations, 
especially with regard to the establishment, composition, 
command, control, and financing of the forces. Actually it 
seems extremely difficult in present circumstances to reach 
any substantial agreement on future peace-keeping operations. 
Any attempt to lay down rules and technical details on 
organisation and administration of future peace-keeping 
operations would be neither necessary nor realistic. The 
Security Council and the General Assembly would take their 
decisions in the future, as they had done in the past, in the 
light of the circumstances of the moment. There is little to 
compel these organs to make their decisions precise as to the 
mode of implementation. It is not advisable therefore to 
undertake advance planning except for very broad general 
guidelines which will be subject to different implementations.
1. General Principles.
In reviewing the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations 
it is possible to draw some general conclusions:
(1) As to the scope of peace-keeping operations we can 
distinguish two main categories, namely observer operations 
(UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, UNYOM) and operations involving the 
deployment of relatively large armed forces (UNEF, ONUC, UNTEA, 
UNFICYP). But in both categories we can distinguish several 
varieties. In the first category, the mandates of the various 
observer operations have varied widely, ranging from the 
observation and maintenance of a truce agreement (UNTSO and 
UNMOGIP) to a much more limited task of reporting, as in the 
case of UNOGIL AND UNYOM. Also the mandates of the various 
forces (the second category of cases) have varied greatly.
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UNEF operated on the Armistice Demarcation Line in Gaza and 
the international Frontier in Sinai, covering a distance of 
about 450 kilometres, while ONUC, with its more complex 
mandate including assistance to the Government of the Congo, 
was far more involved with events of all kinds within the 
boundaries of the Congo.
Moreover, the distinction between the two categories is 
not as clear-cut as it may seem. There is overlapping between 
the two. In some of the situations, as for example in Kashmir, 
Palestine, Lebanon and Cyprus, fighting was actually going on 
when the United Nations operation was undertaken. In most of 
them, outbreaks of violence have been a continuous possibility, 
and actual incidents involving the use of armed forces have 
been regular occurrences, for example, throughout the 
existence of UNTSO and UNMOGIP. It is needless to say that 
the variety of the situations involved had influenced to a 
great extent the size, the methods of recruitment, the methods 
of action and the financing of UN peace-keeping operations.
All of them were ad hoc pragmatic operations adapted 
specifically to each situation.
(2) The second basic characteristic of the UN peace­
keeping operations is their voluntary nature. Not only is the 
consent of a Member nation necessary for the United Nations to 
use its military personnel on its territory, there is also 
another point of principle which arises in relation to the 
question of consent and it refers to the composition of UN 
military elements. The general principle adopted vis-a-vis 
this problem is that while the United Nations must reserve for 
itself the authority to decide on the composition of such 
elements, it is obvious that the host country, in giving its
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consent, cannot be indifferent to the composition of these 
elements. The United Nations should therefore take fully into 
account the viewpoint of the host Government as one of the 
most serious factors which should guide the recruitment of 
the personnel.
With the exception of the United Kingdom forces serving 
in UNFICYP, the national contingents made available to the 
United Nations peace-keeping forces have been made available 
from small powers. We noticed that Dag Hammarskjöld thought 
that to decrease a conflict's threat to international peace, 
the troops of the Great Powers or the states which had a
special interest in the crisis must be excluded from the
199 200forces. This view was given support by U Thant. The
concept behind these views was that of limiting the
possibilities of introducing the Cold War into peace-keeping
operations. However, in cases where the permanent members
agree that a dispute which threatens international peace and
security should be contained, it is quite possible that their
contributions to the field service by civilians and technicians
might assist in achieving that goal. The proposal to establish
a 200-men American civilian surveillance team in the new buffer
zone in the Middle East is of some practical significance. By
it the United States will be effectively locked into formal
supervision of the peace in the Middle East. It is possible
199. Summary Report on the UNEF, UN Doc. A/3943, 9 October 
1958, para 160.
200. Speech by U Thant "Strengthening of the United Nations" 
given at the University of Denver, 3 April 1964.
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to conceive of units of Great Powers' military forces working 
side by side to preserve the peace. They have to be 
considered within the enforcement actions subject to Chapter 
VII of the Charter. Although operations of this nature appear 
unlikely at present this does not mean that they must be ruled 
out for all of the future.
The principle of consent has another implication. It is 
obvious that the nations contributing contingents must be 
given assurance that the forces will not be used in a manner 
contrary to their vital interests. This seems to have been 
one obstacle to establishing permanent UN forces. Even the 
simple earmarking of national forces for UN peace-keeping 
operations does not mean that those forces are automatically 
dispatched to missions at the request of the United Nations. 
The Scandinavian countries which earmarked troops for UN 
service had made it clear that the actual participation of 
these troops in UN peace-keeping operations required their 
explicit consent and agreement.
(3) A third basic characteristic of UN peace-keeping 
operations is that the object is to stop the fighting, or to 
maintain law and order to provide an opportunity for 
negotiated settlement. This is why the military force has 
been associated in most cases with a UN mediatory and 
conciliatory presence. But this does not mean that the UN 
peace-keeping operations had achieved this ultimate objective. 
There is no settlement after many years in Kashmir or in 
Palestine. There is a danger that UN peace-keeping operations 
may be an important factor in freezing a situation, and not 
a device for its solution.
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(4) A fourth basic characteristic of UN peace-keeping 
operations is the use of military force. Peace-keeping is the 
use of military force in order to keep a tense situation 
between States or intra-States under such control that 
substantial violence for the time being does not take place.
(5) Finally, what is crucial in peace-keeping operations 
is not the composition of the force or its terms of reference 
but the control of it. This raises important constitutional 
and political problems which are the real leverage behind any 
peace-keeping operation. The problem of control is two-fold - 
first, the control by the organ authorising the operation, and 
secondly, and more important, the control of the Secretary- 
General over the operation as the chief administrative officer 
of the Organization. But this problem of control, with all 
the political and constitutional issues related to it, is 
better understood through the analysis of the financial crisis 
of the United Nations.
2. The Authorisation Issue.
It is evident that no solution was reached in the Charter 
as to the command of armed forces to be placed at the disposal 
of the Security Council; the provision was simply included 
that this question was to be worked out subsequently. Since 
the agreements called for by Article 43 have not been 
concluded, the question of command has remained suspended.
The failure to implement Chapter VII of the Charter has made 
it necessary for the United Nations to create its resources 
for maintenance of peace by the establishment of special peace­
keeping forces such as UNEF and ONUC. The UN has demonstrated 
on several occasions a capacity to conduct effective
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peace-keeping operations to maintain international peace and 
security in areas of hostilities where other forces would not 
have been welcome. Past experience has taught that peace­
keeping operations were made possible by the peculiar 
circumstances existing at the time each of the operations 
was initiated.
In each instance the United Nations force was created 
through action of an appropriate United Nations organ, either 
the Security Council or the General Assembly. Both organs 
acted within the range of their authority as set out in the 
Charter. One significant distinction between the Security 
Council and the General Assembly provides that the Security 
Council's decisions are binding on the member states, whereas 
the General Assembly is limited to recommendations. This is 
correct with reference to enforcement actions. However, 
enforcement actions initiated by the Security Council under 
the provisions of Chapter VII were not in question in peace­
keeping operations. The measures adopted in peace-keeping 
operations were more comparable to the provisional actions 
contained in Article 40 of the Charter than to the enforcement 
measures as set forth in Articles 41 and 42. Both the Security 
Council and the General Assembly have competent powers to order 
such measures in dealing with disputes. The Security Council 
authority is contained in Article 40; the authority of the 
General Assembly is broadly based within the general Charter 
provisions. The United Nations forces could have been created 
by either of these two organs. If the Security Council is 
unable to act, the matter could then be referred to the 
General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution
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provisions. With the adoption of the "Uniting for Peace" 
resolution, a new channel for safeguarding the peace was 
opened, in which the General Assembly could exert a positive 
influence when the Security Council was unable to act. Great 
Power agreement has to be initiated before any effective 
collective measures could be achieved. Otherwise one of the 
Great Powers could plan to hinder the United Nations attempts 
to restore peace and security. There was a temporary decline 
in the role of the Security Council, but soon after the 
detente this organ regained its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The role of 
the Security Council in ending the October War between the 
Arab States and Israel re-emphasised the importance of that 
organ.
It is not possible for the Security Council or the 
General Assembly to exercise control over all the detailed 
aspects of a particular operation. Neither of the organs has 
the administrative facilities to provide day-to-day supervision 
of a peace-keeping operation. Such facilities are available 
in the Secretariat. The Security Council and the General 
Assembly may under the provisions of Article 98 of the Charter 
request the Secretary-General to establish a peace-keeping 
force "and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted 
to him by these organs." The appropriate United Nations organ 
maintains control of the force while the Secretary-General 
acts as its executive agent. The Secretary-General, with his 
staff and technicians, has the capacity to supervise the 
operations. Therefore, the Secretary-General has been asked 
by the responsible United Nations organ to direct the force.
137
It is difficult to envisage how a peace-keeping operation 
could have been directed without such assistance being 
available to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General 
assumed a significant role in the direction of the operations 
particularly during Hammarskjöld's term of office. In fact, 
the peace-keeping concept is associated with Dag Hammarskjöld. 
In his capacity as Secretary-General in 1956 and again in 
1960, he played a leading role in organising and directing 
UNEF and ONUC. He was also the guiding force behind other 
efforts to take peace-keeping action on behalf of the
flr Ttr* ^ ovj‘ t 1  ^r -A-1 u
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No complete consideration of United Nations peace-keeping 
can ignore the complicated question of financing. This subject 
dominated the stage during the crisis surrounding the Nineteenth 
General Assembly. Because of the division of opinion, the 
Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations (Committee of 33) 
was set up by a General Assembly resolution in 1965, to 
undertake a comprehensive review of the whole question of 
peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, but has so far 
failed to agree on proposals for improving the machinery and 
procedural system for conducting them. This problem has had 
a significant effect on the attitudes of member states towards
the intervention of international forces in conflict situations, 
with the result that there has often been total inaction by 
the Security Council at times when international peace and 
security have been in danger. Any resolution to solve the 
financial crisis must be accompanied by some form of political 
agreement on all aspects of peace-keeping operations. The
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initial method adopted to pay for United Nations peace
r
operations was the relatively simple and direct procedure of 
including these expenses in the regular United Nations budget.
It was the procedure followed in paying the costs associated 
with most UN operations. The expenses of UNEF and ONUC were 
set forth in a Special Account, to be paid by the member 
states on a scale of assessments similar to that used for the 
regular budget. The additional costs had to be made up by 
relying on voluntary contributions. Another method of 
financing was first utilised in West New Guinea. In this 
case the participants directly concerned bore the costs. The 
expenditures of peace-keeping operations should be considered 
the responsibility of the entire membership. This position 
was supported by the decision of the International Court of 
Justice, (2.0 July l U x ) .
But how should the expenses be apportioned among the 
membership? There has been much sympathy for the so-called 
Irish proposal to establish a special scale of assessments for 
peace-keeping based on ability to pay. The first peace-keeping 
operation which was created under the new conception took 
place when the Security Council deployed a UNEF after the 
October 1973 War. This operation had to be seen in a 
completely new light, because of the direct role of superpowers.
3. The Role of the Detente.
The role of the United Nations in keeping the peace is 
much more important today than it was previously. The 
principal reason for this has been the 'Detente'.
The detente made it possible for the Security Council to 
act with reasonable speed in the last Middle East crisis. It
* lo August:
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has proved possible for the superpowers to assert 
responsibility because they seem to be in agreement on the 
basic objective of implementing Security Council Resolution 
242 of November 1967. After the United States and the Soviet 
Union had at last got their lines uncrossed, the role of the 
Security Council in maintaining peace and security became 
easier. The Council was able to end the October 1973 War 
between the Arab States and Israel, and to deploy UN emergency 
forces between the belligerents on both the Egyptian and 
Syrian fronts.
The Middle East war of October 1973 and the emergence 
of UNEFII, followed by UNDOF, is bound to encourage a more 
positive reaction by governments to the contribution that 
international forces can make to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. Moreover, it gives the Security Council a new 
opportunity to review the machinery and political procedures 
for creating peace-keeping operations.
Because of prejudices and misunderstanding of the 
function of peace-keeping forces, and of the limitations on 
their objectives, they have tended to become the target of 
criticism. Because of this, their undeniable potential has 
been ignored.
The lack of political initiative coinciding with the 
peace-keeping presence renders the single instrument of peace­
keeping indefinite and in certain instances counter-productive 
in the settlement of the dispute, despite the undeniable success 
of the operation itself. ThU lack of understanding has done 
much to damage the image of peace-keeping machinery, and to 
cause its capability as a contribution to conflict control to
be underestimated.
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It is significant that after a vacuum of nearly ten 
years in which no new UN peace-keeping operations were 
undertaken, the United Nations is once more in the peace­
keeping business.
Because of their implications in terms of future 
peace-keeping prospects and possibilities, the influences 
and considerations that created UNEF II are worth noting.
The climate of the detente affects many relationships in this 
regard. The progress of events in the Middle East war of 
October 1973 showed the strength of the detente. No peace 
initiative emerged because of a lack of consensus among the 
Council's membership during the first days of the War. The 
United Nations appeared to be achieving nothing. In the 
meantime, US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had been 
holding an almost non-stop dialogue with Anatoly Dobrynin, 
the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, which led to direct 
communication between President Nixon and Mr Brezhnev. Even 
so, both superpowers moved, Russia indicated its preparedness 
to send troops to the area, and America reacted by placing its 
force on alert. These moves threatened to destroy the detente 
and with it any chance of peace in the Middle East.
The urgent invitation to Dr Kissinger to go to Moscow on 
20 October 1973 seemed to indicate concern to maintain the 
detente, and especially to use it as a basis for joint crisis- 
management. After the visit came the first joint action. The 
Security Council adopted its resolution 338 of 22 October 1973 
A number of factors may have influenced the superpowers to act 
in harmony. It seems that the primary consideration was that 
both had recognised that they were on an undesired collision 
course which could lead to a direct confrontation between them
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The consequences could have been catastrophic and to avoid 
them they had to act together through the United Nations.
The most important aspect of the crisis began with the 
Israeli breach of the first cease-fire from about 23 October 
to 26 October 1973. When Egypt asked that a joint Soviet- 
American force should be sent to the Middle East, Dr Kissinger, 
at a press conference (25 October 1973), rejected the proposal. 
And therefore it seemed to him that the political purposes 
would be best served if any international force that were 
introduced were composed of countries that have themselves no 
possibility of being drawn into rivalry as a result of being 
there.
UNEF II was created (SC Res.340, 25 October 1973) by 
drawing on the peace force already in Cyprus and the first 
troops to arrive in the Canal Zone were the Austrian, Finnish 
and Swedish contingents from UNFICYP, followed soon after by 
the Irish. Later this force was strengthened by the arrival 
of contingents from Canada, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama, 
Peru, Poland and Senegal.
4. Prospects for the Future.
Certain aspects of United Nations operations could be 
improved by advance planning, among them the difficulties 
experienced in integrating national contingents and the 
headquarters staff, lack of suitable technical personnel, 
logistics and language problems, the need for special training 
for UN forces, particularly that the force should be capable 
of self-defence in conventional and guerrilla warfare, crowd 
control and observation duties. The United Nations should 
establish, together with the contributing countries, a planning
staff.
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Obviously there are many things that might be done to 
improve future capabilities of the United Nations' peace­
keeping forces through a planning staff. One of the first 
steps that might be taken would be to encourage the earmarking 
of national force contingents for peace-keeping service. The 
immediate availability of qualified national contingents is 
very important particularly during the early stages of a 
crisis, to ensure that field operations undertaken by these 
contingents have a greater chance for success. Peace-keeping 
requires a broad range of professional skills and techniques.
Perhaps some sort of arrangements could be agreed upon 
for providing professional military advice, as required, to 
the Secretary-General for operations with which he is charged 
by the Security Council.
There is no UN handbook or guide to peace-keeping, nor 
has it ever been the policy of the Secretariat to publish 
evaluations or commentaries based on past experience of 
peace-keeping operations and missions. Clearly, some kind of 
handbook is necessary, consolidating in one manual the essence 
of the information required, the peace-keeping provisions of 
the Charter, the peace-keeping machinery within the organs of 
the UN, the legal and broad political aspects of the Status of 
the Force, the mounting and functioning of forces, standing 
operating procedures and the use of force, as well as aids to 
preparation and training.
There is a growing unanimity among permanent and 
non-permanent members of the Security Council that it should 
not only act to stop wars, but that it should be the instrument 
through which initiatives towards this end should be taken.
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There is an urgent need to improve the procedures for 
developing peace-keeping techniques and the operational skills 
required in their practical application. This does not require 
revision of the Charter; it means using the Charter with 
greater flexibility. For example, a reactivation of the 
Military Staff Committee to a more positive and broadly based 
role in its relationship with the Security Council, a 
multi-professional advisory group including political, 
diplomatic, military, legal, economic and research members 
whose advice to the Secretary-General could be of some 
significant value in the preparation and conduct of peace­
keeping operations.
The essence of peace-keeping is not only to separate the 
disputants and keep them apart, but ultimately to bring them 
together. Peace-keeping must be closely linked to an overall 
peace effort.
If the United Nations became strong enough to provide 
reliable peace-keeping, many countries might give less 
attention to military security and divert financial resources 
to much-needed economic development. Nations, in the nuclear 
age, can no longer afford to protect their interests through 
the traditional use of force without risking their own 
destruction. They need special peace-keeping forces which can 
do for them what they can no longer afford to do themselves.
The UN forces can and should be a substitute for 
superpower military involvement in certain circumstances.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union are aware that 
under the cover of collective responsibility UN peace-keeping 
permits action without committing the vital interests of 
either power.
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Many of the member states of the United Nations attach 
the highest importance to the concept of international peace­
keeping, and in general support the particular forms it has 
taken. The Soviet bloc, France and a few other countries 
have generally been opposed to peace-keeping when authorised 
by the General Assembly and have been reluctant to countenance 
the use of peace-keeping forces, even under Security Council 
authorisation, when that did not involve immediate and 
continuous supervision by the Security Council. Obviously, 
the future of the United Nations peace-keeping operations 
will depend on the collective attitudes of the member states, 
particularly the superpowers.
In reviewing the above-mentioned record of peace-keeping 
activities, we have noticed that large peace-keeping operations 
posed major problems which cannot be solved without a political 
consensus that includes the Great Powers. In fact, it is 
difficult to conceive any peace-keeping operation being 
created without the consent of the superpowers.
Once the concept of the role of the United Nations is 
acknowledged, military matters, financing, and legal questions 
may be resolved. Despite the financial crisis and the 
subsequent difficulties faced in attempting to resolve some 
of the pressing problems concerning the future of peace-keeping 
operations, the majority of member states are willing to 
accept the United Nations' role in peace-keeping operations. 
That is why it is appropriate to assume that the United 
Nations will continue to play its role in peace-keeping 
operations. The new experience in creating UNEF II and UNDOF
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has revived hope that it might still be possible to get 
general agreement on peace-keeping machinery and procedures 
that would increase international confidence in the UN's 
capacity to meet its obligations under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.
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